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ABSTRACT
RIGHTING WEB DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 2018
JOHN VILK
B.Sc., WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Emery D. Berger
The web browser is the most important application runtime today, encompassing all
types of applications on practically every Internet-connected device. Browsers power com-
plete office suites, media players, games, and augmented and virtual reality experiences, and
they integrate with cameras, microphones, GPSes, and other sensors available on computing
devices. Many apparently native mobile and desktop applications are secretly hybrid apps
that contain a mix of native and browser code. History has shown that when new devices,
sensors, and experiences appear on the market, the browser will evolve to support them.
Despite the browser’s importance, developing web applications is exceedingly difficult.
Web browsers organically evolved from a document viewer into a ubiquitous program run-
time. The browser’s scripting language for web designers, JavaScript, has grown into the
only universally supported programming language in the browser. Unfortunately, JavaScript
is notoriously difficult to write and debug. The browser’s high-level and event-driven I/O
interfaces make it easy to add simple interactions to webpages, but these same interfaces
lead to nondeterministic bugs and performance issues in larger applications. These bugs
are challenging for developers to reason about and fix.
vii
This dissertation revisits web development and provides developers with a complete set
of development tools with full support for the browser environment. McFly is the first time-
traveling debugger for the browser, and lets developers debug web applications and their
visual state during time-travel; components of this work shipped in Microsoft’s ChakraCore
JavaScript engine. BLeak is the first system for automatically debugging memory leaks
in web applications, and provides developers with a ranked list of memory leaks along
with the source code responsible for them. BCause constructs a causal graph of a web
application’s events, which helps developers understand their code’s behavior. Doppio lets
developers run code written in conventional languages in the browser, and Browsix brings
Unix into the browser to enable unmodified programs expecting a Unix-like environment to
run directly in the browser. Together, these five systems form a solid foundation for web
development.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
A web browser is present on nearly every internet-connected device, making the browser
one of the most important application platforms today. The browser lets developers write
code once and run it nearly literally anywhere. Even many apparently native mobile and
desktop applications are secretly hybrid apps that contain a mix of native and browser code.
Despite its popularity, the browser presents a challenging environment for writing, de-
bugging, and optimizing web applications. Web applications must be written in JavaScript,
which is completely event-driven, designed for concurrency, and extraordinarily dynamic.
As a result, web applications can have complicated behavior that is difficult to debug, opti-
mize, and understand. The browser’s complex high-level runtime environment coupled with
JavaScript’s dynamism makes it easy for developers to accidentally introduce memory leaks
while simultaneously obscuring their root cause. Developers cannot re-use or easily port
code written in traditional programming languages, such as Java and C++, because the
browser exposes unfamiliar and incompatible abstractions for a variety of common tasks.
Existing browser development tools provide little assistance for these issues because they
use techniques designed for conventional runtime environments.
To address these issues, this dissertation presents a complete set of tools that form a
solid foundation for web development. These tools make it easier for developers to write,
debug, optimize, and understand their web applications.
McFly: Time-Travel Debugging for the Web
Time-traveling debuggers offer the promise of simplifying debugging by letting devel-
opers freely step forwards and backwards through a program’s execution. However, web
applications present multiple challenges that make time-travel debugging especially diffi-
cult. A time-traveling debugger for web applications must accurately reproduce all network
interactions, asynchronous events, and visual states observed during the original execu-
tion, both while stepping forwards and backwards at interactive speeds. This dissertation
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presents McFly, the first time-traveling debugger for web applications. McFly departs
from previous approaches by operating on a high-level representation of the browser’s inter-
nal state. This approach lets McFly provide accurate time-travel debugging—maintaining
JavaScript and visual state in sync at all times–at interactive speeds. I have implemented
McFly as an extension to Microsoft Edge, and core parts of McFly have been integrated
into a time-traveling debugger for Microsoft’s ChakraCore JavaScript engine [89].
BLeak: Automatically Debugging Memory Leaks in Web Applications
Web application memory leaks can take many forms, including failing to dispose of un-
needed event listeners, repeatedly injecting iframes and CSS files, and failing to call cleanup
routines in third-party libraries. Leaks degrade responsiveness and can even lead to browser
tab crashes by exhausting available memory. Because previous leak detection approaches
designed for conventional C, C++ or Java applications are ineffective in the browser envi-
ronment, tracking down leaks currently requires intensive manual effort by web developers.
This dissertation introduces BLeak, the first system for automatically debugging mem-
ory leaks in web applications [144]. BLeak’s algorithms leverage the observation that in
modern web applications, users often repeatedly return to the same (approximate) visual
state (e.g., the inbox view in Gmail). Sustained growth between round trips is a strong
indicator of a memory leak. To use BLeak, a developer writes a short script to drive a web
application in round trips to the same visual state. BLeak then automatically generates
a list of leaks found along with their root causes, ranked by return on investment. Guided
by BLeak, I identify and fix over 50 memory leaks in popular libraries and apps including
Airbnb, AngularJS, Google Analytics, Google Maps SDK, and jQuery.
BCause: Causal Program Understanding for Web Applications
It is challenging for developers and automated tools to reason about control flow in
web applications because the browser is notoriously asynchronous. In particular, web ap-
plication execution is completely event-driven, and it is often challenging to reason about
why events occur in the first place. This dissertation introduces BCause, a framework for
understanding the causality of JavaScript events in web applications. During a browsing
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session, BCause constructs a trace of events and web application actions that cause events.
BCause uses the trace to construct a causal graph of the JavaScript events that occur in
an execution, letting developers and automated tools trace events back to their root causes.
Using BCause, I build a tool called AdBlame that uses causal graphs and ad blocker
filter lists to accurately predict the bandwidth consumption of a web application with an
ad blocker enabled.
Doppio: Breaking the Browser Language Barrier
Web applications must be written in JavaScript, the native language of the browser.
Existing code written in traditional programming languages cannot be directly translated to
JavaScript because the browser is missing traditional operating system abstractions required
for that code to run. This dissertation presents Doppio, a runtime system written in
JavaScript that breaks the browser language barrier [143]. Doppio emulates single-process
POSIX abstractions including threads, an extensible file system, outgoing TCP sockets, and
unmanaged memory on top of the unfamiliar resources that the browser already provides. I
demonstrate Doppio’s usefulness with two case studies: I extend Emscripten with Doppio,
letting it run an unmodified C++ application in the browser with full functionality, and
present DoppioJVM, an interpreter that runs unmodified JVM programs directly in the
browser.
Browsix: Bridging the Gap Between Unix and the Browser
Although Doppio lets additional programming languages run on the web with full
functionality, it does not act as an operating system and cannot be used to port multi-process
systems or servers into the browser. This dissertation presents Browsix, a framework
that bridges the considerable gap between conventional operating systems and the browser,
enabling unmodified programs expecting a Unix-like environment to run directly in the
browser [111]. Browsix comprises two core parts: (1) a JavaScript-only system that makes
core Unix features (including pipes, concurrent processes, signals, sockets, and a shared file
system) available to web applications; and (2) extended JavaScript runtimes for C, C++,
Go, and Node.js that support running programs written in these languages as processes in
3
the browser. I illustrate Browsix’s capabilities via case studies that demonstrate how it
eases porting legacy applications to the browser and enables new functionality.
4
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
Over a period of decades, the browser organically evolved from a static document viewer
into an application runtime with the complexity of an operating system. As shown in
Figure 1.1, a web application’s state is distributed among components including a JavaScript
engine that controls computation and a layout engine that controls the user interface and
other forms of I/O. This chapter briefly documents the browser’s evolution in order to
concretely define web applications, provides an overview of the browser’s architecture and
core features, and describes modern web development tools.
1.1 From Web Pages to Applications
While many still think of web pages in terms of an HTML document located at a specific
URL, many web pages today like YouTube, Weather.com, and Gmail are web applications
that generate their UI inside the browser using JavaScript. It is the latter type of web page
that this dissertation is concerned with.
Figure 1.1: A system diagram of a modern web browser. All major web browsers separate
web application computation (JavaScript engine) from I/O (Layout Engine). The layout
engine is multithreaded, while JavaScript code executes on a single hardware thread.
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1.1.1 Web Pages
When Tim Berners-Lee wrote the first web browser in 1990, web sites were composed
of static hypertext (HTML) documents, or web pages, stored on an HTTP server’s file
system. Beyond clicking hyperlinks to navigate between documents, these web pages were
not interactive, and served only as a vehicle for conveying information to their readers.
A few years later, the common gateway interface (CGI) made it possible to write pro-
grams, known as CGI scripts, that run server-side and generate web pages on the fly [114].
CGI scripts could also process data that users submit via HTML forms, which let developers
add basic interactivity to web sites. However, individual web pages were still completely
static once loaded. Although a user could type text into a form field, the browser itself
processed the key presses and rendered the resulting text. When the user submits a form,
the browser sends data to the server and completely reloads the web page, letting the CGI
script running server-side process the form data and re-generate the web page in response.
Many staples of the early web were built using CGI scripts, including message boards,
guestbooks, visitor counters, and online stores [119].
1.1.2 Web Applications
With the introduction of JavaScript in the mid-90’s, web pages themselves became in-
teractive, leading to a shift from web pages to web applications. JavaScript lets a web page
perform arbitrary computations, respond to user interactions, and change its presentation
at-will without contacting the server or reloading the web page. While the precise definition
of a web application is not universally agreed upon, this dissertation defines a web applica-
tion to be a web page that uses JavaScript to control its presentation and interactions.
Web applications are not only used on websites; many native and mobile applications
are also written completely or partially using HTML, CSS, and JavaScript, and run a web
browser internally. By writing an application in this manner, developers can target multiple
platforms and devices using the same codebase. Beyond the packaging step required to
bundle the application into an executable and a few platform-specific APIs, the process of
developing these applications is identical to that for a traditional web application and faces
many of the same challenges discussed in this dissertation.
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1.2 Browser Architecture and Core Features
The browser provides developers with a feature-rich environment that enables a wide
variety of applications. However, browser engineers retrofit this environment into an ar-
chitecture that was originally designed for viewing documents. This section describes this
architecture, which is also shown in Figure 1.1, along with its defining features and limita-
tions.
1.2.1 Browser Overview
Every major web browser contains a JavaScript engine that performs pure JavaScript
computation (§1.2.2) and a layout engine that interacts with the OS to provide function-
ality such as network requests, timers, and the GUI (§1.2.3): V8 [50] and Blink [27] (for
Chrome), JavaScriptCore [8] and WebKit [10] (for Safari), SpiderMonkey [99] and Gecko [93]
(for Firefox), and Chakra [88] and EdgeHTML [107] (for Edge). The layout engine exposes
this functionality to JavaScript code through a set of JavaScript interfaces, commonly re-
ferred to as the Document Object Model (DOM) [56]. The DOM provides JavaScript code
with the ability to perform various I/O operations (§1.2.4), many of which are asynchronous,
leading to pervasive event-based concurrency (§1.2.5). The layout engine does not provide
JavaScript code with access to shared memory multithreading. Instead, the layout engine
supports shared-nothing worker threads to enable parallel processing, and proposed exten-
sions to the web platform add support for a restricted form of shared memory parallelism
(§1.2.6).
1.2.2 JavaScript Engine
JavaScript code executes within the JavaScript engine, which processes events from
a single-threaded event loop that is controlled by the browser’s layout engine (shown in
Figure 1.1). The layout engine produces JavaScript events in response to external events,
such as timers firing. To subscribe to an event, JavaScript code uses a DOM interface to
provide the layout engine with a function as an event handler. The layout engine places
each JavaScript event into the event queue where it waits to be processed. The JavaScript
thread processes these events and invokes event handlers one at a time.
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While JavaScript code executes, the layout engine locks the UI to prevent concurrent
user input, such as typing into a form field. As a corollary, long-running events degrade
the responsiveness of the webpage. If an event takes too long to execute, the web browser
provides the user with the option of killing the unresponsive web application.
1.2.3 Layout Engine
The layout engine is the heart of the browser, and is responsible for a web application’s
input and output. The layout engine provides JavaScript code with the DOM, which con-
tains high-level interfaces for timers, network requests, GUI manipulation, and more. The
layout engine also processes HTML, CSS, and user input, which impact DOM-visible state
independent from JavaScript execution. DOM interfaces reflect and manipulate state that
the layout engine manages and can update independent of JavaScript execution.
For example, the DOM represents the GUI as a tree of HTML elements. JavaScript code
accesses elements in the tree as JavaScript objects via the document object, but these objects
are purely reflective proxies into layout engine state. Reading the offsetLeft property on a
GUI element triggers a query to the layout engine, which calculates how far left the element
is relative to a parent element.
1.2.4 I/O Abstractions
Unlike conventional program environments, browsers do not provide web applications
with access to traditional operating system resources. Instead, browsers expose a variety
of abstractions for tasks that have organically grown out of the needs of the web. For
example, instead of a file system, browsers include storage interfaces that provide key-value
and object database abstractions. Instead of raw sockets, browsers include an interface that
makes HTTP requests, and an interface that establishes an outgoing full-duplex message-
based WebSocket connection to a server over TCP.
1.2.5 Event-based Concurrency
While JavaScript is single-threaded, Figure 1.1 shows that the layout engine is not.
The layout engine exposes asynchronous APIs in JavaScript that dispatch tasks that run
concurrently with JavaScript execution, such as network requests, timers, and persistent
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storage requests. These tasks communicate with the application via events, which the
layout engine enqueues in parallel with JavaScript execution. Thus, web applications are
actually highly concurrent; given the same application input, events can execute in different
orders across executions.
1.2.6 Worker Threads
In modern browsers, JavaScript code can spawn worker threads that execute within
their own isolated JavaScript context. These worker threads do not share any memory
with the main thread or each other, and can only communicate with their parent through
a bidirectional and asynchronous message passing interface. Worker threads also have no
access to the application’s GUI and have their own separate event queues. Counterintu-
itively, worker threads are a resource provided by the layout engine, which relays messages
between JavaScript contexts.
Upcoming changes to the browser enable a restricted form of shared memory between
JavaScript contexts. With these changes, multiple JavaScript contexts can share a SharedAr-
rayBuffer, which encapsulates a binary buffer of memory. Like the existing ArrayBuffer
interface, these buffers can be interpreted as an array of specific numeric types, such as 8-
bit unsigned integers and 64-bit floating point numbers. In addition, browsers will provide
atomic operations on the contents of SharedArrayBuffer, including futex primitives [26].
1.3 Web Development Tools
Web developers use a variety of tools to write, debug, and optimize their applications.
Some of these tools are integrated with the browser itself to provide deeper support for visual
state that the layout engine manages. These tools are largely adaptations of conventional
software development tools.
1.3.1 Debugging Correctness Issues
When a web application is not behaving in the way the developer intended, web devel-
opers have only a few basic tools at their disposal to help them track down bugs.
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Figure 1.2: A web application running in Microsoft Edge and paused on a breakpoint.
Standard browser debuggers let developers inspect DOM state and view the application’s
GUI at breakpoints.
Console printing: One classic debugging technique is to add print statements to a program
that log potentially informative messages to standard output; this practice is commonly
called printf debugging. Developers can also use this technique in the browser. While web
applications lack access to standard output streams, browsers contain a hidden web console
that web applications can print to using the console JavaScript interface. Developers can
view the console using the browser’s development tools.
Stepping debugger: All modern web browsers contain a conventional stepping debugger
that let developers set breakpoints, single-step through JavaScript execution, and inspect
live application state [9, 16, 90, 94]. The debugger displays application state stored in the
JavaScript engine and the layout engine, and provides a JavaScript REPL for more advanced
queries. Figure 1.2 displays a screenshot of Microsoft Edge’s debugger, which lets the
developer examine the DOM while the application is paused on a breakpoint. This feature
is standard across browser debuggers.
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1.3.2 Debugging Memory Overhead
All of the browser components in Figure 1.1 have state that contributes to a web applica-
tion’s memory footprint. A higher memory footprint reduces application responsiveness and
can even trigger browser tab crashes by exhausting available memory [15, 52, 68, 85, 105].
Browsers contain a few tools that report information about memory usage and memory
allocations.
Heap snapshots: Some browsers contain a heap snapshot tool that collects a graph of the
application’s heap, where objects are nodes and references are edges, and displays it to the
user. In this paragraph, I refer specifically to views in Google Chrome’s heap snapshot tool,
which largely matches the functionality in other browsers. Each snapshot includes state
from both the JavaScript engine and the layout engine. A summary view groups objects by
their type, and displays the total number of objects of that type, their combined shallow size,
and their combined retained size. A containment view displays the application’s garbage
collection roots as trees, letting developers dig down into the application’s state. Two
snapshots can be diffed to show which objects have been allocated inbetween the snapshots.
Memory timeline: In Chrome, the Performance Timeline tool displays basic data associ-
ated with the application’s memory footprint over time [17]. The timeline contains separate
lines for the JavaScript heap size in bytes, the number of active HTML documents, the num-
ber of active DOM nodes, the number of active event listeners, and the amount of GPU
memory in use.
The JavaScript heap line does not differentiate between live and dead heap state, and
merely displays the size of allocated items in the heap. When a garbage collection occurs,
the JavaScript heap line drops to reflect the collected garbage. Typically, the memory
timeline of a web application describes a sawtooth pattern, where the application’s memory
usage quickly grows until the JavaScript engine performs a garbage collection that reduces
the heap to a baseline size. If the baseline size increases over time, the application might
have a leak.
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Figure 1.3: A 5 second timeline collected with Google Chrome while loading Facebook.
1.3.3 Understanding Program Behavior
The browser environment is pervasively asynchronous, which makes it challenging for
developers to understand their code’s behavior. Most browsers contain a performance time-
line tool, which provides limited insights into a web application’s behavior [7, 17, 86, 98].
Google Chrome’s debugger has support for asynchronous call stacks, which extends call
stacks into preceding JavaScript events.
Performance timeline: Most browsers contain a performance timeline that logs event
schedules from individual executions along with other metadata. These timelines present
a substantial amount of information over a short duration of time; Figure 1.3 displays a
timeline of less than 5 seconds collected while loading a Facebook feed. Timelines do not
display causal information regarding the source of each event, so developers cannot easily
use a timeline to investigate the root causes of asynchronous program behavior.
Asynchronous call stacks: Normally, when a JavaScript debugger is paused on a break-
point, the debugger displays a call stack that ends with the event listener that the browser
invoked to handle the current event. Google Chrome’s asynchronous call stack feature
extends the displayed call stack with the call stack from the JavaScript context that regis-
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tered the event listener in the first place. From there, the call stack continues to previously
recorded asynchronous call stacks.
While asynchronous call stacks provide a causal chain to prior events, they do not sup-
port implicit control flow through the DOM and are limited to displaying a single prior
async call stack. For example, a JavaScript code may create a new script element, assign
a URL to its src property, and insert it into the webpage, which loads a JavaScript file that
initiates a timer. When paused on the timer, the Chrome debugger does not include asyn-
chronous stack traces from the JavaScript code that created the script element, breaking
the causal chain and preventing developers from examining why the script was loaded in
the first place. As a result, asynchronous stack traces provide limited help to developers
that are trying to understand complicated program behavior.
1.3.4 Porting Code to the Browser
JavaScript is the only programming language that all major web browsers support.
Code written in other programming languages can run in the browser via native plugins,
or compilers that translate the code into JavaScript.
Plugins: Historically, browsers have been able to execute code written in Java, C#/Visual
Basic (Silverlight), and ActionScript (Flash) via third-party plugins that execute outside
of the browser sandbox and in a native environment [3, 60, 87]. Due to security concerns,
all major web browsers will completely disable native plugins by 2020 [44,65, 92,117]. The
Java, Silverlight, and Flash plugins will be discontinued by that time [2, 118, 124]. As a
result, plugins are no longer a viable method for bringing programming languages to the
browser.
Compilers: One common way to bring programming languages to a new environment is to
build a compiler that targets the environment. Compilers exist that translate languages like
C and C++ (Emscripten [153]), Java (GWT [51]), and Go (GopherJS [101]) into JavaScript.
However, these compilers only support a subset of each language’s standard libraries and
language features because the browser does not provide direct access to operating system
primitives. Developers must manually modify and port any code that depends on missing
operating system support. In addition, since the browser does not provide a thread-based
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execution environment or blocking I/O primitives, most of these compilers require develop-
ers to refactor code to execute in an asynchronous and event-driven manner. If the code
relies on stack state, developers must manually perform “stack ripping” [4] to convert code
into continuation-passing style.
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CHAPTER 2
CHALLENGES IN WEB DEVELOPMENT
Despite offering a wide variety of conventional development tools, the browser remains a
challenging environment for application development. Conventional techniques do not help
developers overcome the unique challenges of the browser environment.
2.1 Debugging Correctness Issues
Web applications are notoriously frustrating to debug. While browsers contain inte-
grated debuggers, they often provide little assistance to developers. If a bug is the result
of a specific event order (a Heisenbug), the act of debugging can disrupt the event schedule
and prevent the bug from appearing. Even when a bug does recur while debugging, iden-
tifying its root cause can be difficult: in event-driven settings like the web, bug symptoms
can manifest far from their root causes.
There are two widely used approaches to find these bugs: scattering logging statements
around the program (a.k.a. “printf debugging” using console.log), or placing breakpoints
to pause the program at specific statements. Both are laborious and iterative processes.
Poring over logs to identify bugs often reveals the need to rerun the program with new
logging statements in place. Using breakpoints, developers step the program forwards until
the first sign that something has gone wrong. Unfortunately, if the breakpoint does not
precede the root cause of the bug, the developer must reset breakpoints and restart execution
from the beginning. As a result, debugging is currently an arduous and painstaking process
for web developers.
2.2 Memory Leaks
Browsers have an established reputation for consuming significant amounts of mem-
ory [54, 82, 95]. Memory leaks in web applications only exacerbate the situation by further
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1 class Preview extends PureComponent {
2 // Runs when Preview is added to GUI
3 componentDidMount() {
4 const { codeMirror } = this.props.editor;
5 const wrapper = codeMirror.getWrapperElement();
6 codeMirror.on("scroll", this.onScroll);
7 wrapper.addEventListener("mouseover", this._mover);
8 wrapper.addEventListener("mouseup", this._mup);
9 wrapper.addEventListener("mousedown", this._mdown);
10 }
11 }
Figure 2.1: A memory leak in Firefox’s debugger. This code (truncated for readability)
leaks 0.5MB every time a developer opens a source file. Prior approaches, such as leak
detectors that rely on staleness metrics, would fail to find these leaks because the leaked
objects (event listeners) are frequently touched.
increasing browser memory footprints. These leaks happen when the application references
unneeded state, preventing the garbage collector from collecting it. Web application mem-
ory leaks can take many forms, including failing to dispose of unneeded event listeners,
repeatedly injecting iframes and CSS files, and failing to call cleanup routines in third-
party libraries. Leaks are a serious concern for developers since they lead to higher garbage
collection frequency and overhead. They reduce application responsiveness and can even
trigger browser tab crashes by exhausting available memory [15,52,68,85,105].
Prior techniques and existing tools fall short when debugging leaks in web applications.
Figure 2.1 displays a representative memory leak in Firefox’s debugger, which is a pure
HTML5 application that can run as a normal web application in any browser. Lines 6-9
register four event listeners on the debugger’s text editor (codeMirror) and its GUI object
(wrapper) every time the user views a source file. The leak occurs because the code fails to
remove the listeners when the view is closed. Each event listener leaks this, which points
to an instance of Preview.
2.2.1 Prior Automated Techniques
There currently are no effective automated techniques for finding memory leaks in web
applications. Previous effective automated techniques for finding memory leaks operate in
the context of conventional applications written in C, C++, and Java. These techniques
predominantly use a staleness metric to discover [19, 53, 103] or rank [150] memory leaks,
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but the four memory leaks in the Firefox debugger would not be considered stale. These
four listeners continue to execute and touch leaked state every time the user uses the mouse
on the editor, marking that state as “fresh”. In web applications, many leaks are connected
to browser events.
Prior growth-based techniques assume that leaked objects are uniquely owned (domi-
nated) by a single object or that they form strongly connected components in the heap [91,
150]. These assumptions do not hold for the leaked objects in the Firefox debugger because
1) they are owned by four separate leak locations that are only dominated by the global
scope, and 2) they reference the global scope (window) and are thus strongly connected with
nearly the entire heap. These properties are common in web applications.
2.2.2 Manual Leak Debugging via Heap Snapshots
Since there are currently no automated techniques for identifying memory leaks in web
applications, developers are forced to use manual approaches. The current state of the art
is manual processing of heap snapshots. This approach does not effectively identify leaking
objects or provide useful diagnostic information, and it thus does little to help developers
locate and fix memory leaks.
The most popular way to manually debug memory leaks is via the three heap snapshot
technique introduced by the Gmail team [68]. Developers repeat a task twice on a webpage
and examine still-live objects created from the first run of the task. The assumption is that
each run will clear out most of the objects created from the previous run and leave behind
only leaking objects; in practice, it does not.
To apply this technique to Firefox’s debugger, the developer takes a heap snapshot after
loading the debugger, a second snapshot after opening a source file, and a third snapshot
after closing and re-opening a source file. Then, the developer filters the third heap snapshot
to focus only on objects allocated between the first and second.
This filtered view, shown in Figure 2.2a, does not clearly identify a memory leak. Most of
these objects are simply reused from the previous execution of the task and are not actually
leaks, but developers must manually inspect these objects before they can come to that
conclusion. The top item, Array, conflates all arrays in the application under one heading
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(a) A truncated heap snapshot of the Firefox de-
bugger, filtered using the three snapshot tech-
nique. The only relevant item is Preview, which
appears low on the list underneath non-leaking
objects.
(b) The retaining paths for Preview, the primary
leaking object in the Firefox debugger. Finding
the code responsible for leaking this object in-
volves searching the entire production code base
for identifiers in the retaining paths, which are
commonly managed by third-party libraries and
obfuscated via minification.
Figure 2.2: The manual memory leak debugging process. Currently, developers debug leaks
by first examining heap snapshots to find leaking objects. Then, they try to use retaining
paths to locate the code responsible. Unfortunately, these paths have no connection to
code, so developers must search their codebase for identifiers referenced in the paths. This
process can be time consuming and ultimately fruitless.
because JavaScript is dynamically typed. Confusingly, the entry (array) just below it refers
to internal V8 arrays, which are not under the application’s direct control. Developers would
be unlikely to suspect the Preview object, the primary leak, because it both appears low on
the list and has a small retained size.
Even if a developer identifies a leaking object in a snapshot, it remains challenging to
diagnose and fix because the snapshot contains no relation to code. The snapshot only
provides retaining paths in the heap, which are often controlled by a third party library or
the browser itself. As Figure 2.2b shows, the retaining paths for a leaking Preview object
stem from an array and an unidentified DOM object. Locating the code responsible for
a leak using these retaining paths involves grepping through the code for instances of the
identifiers along the path. This task is often further complicated by two factors: (1) the
presence of third-party libraries, which must be manually inspected; and (2) the common
use of minification, which effectively obfuscates code and heap paths by reducing most
variable names and some object properties to single letters.
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2.3 Understanding Program Behavior
Web applications are completely event-driven, which makes it challenging for developers
and automated tools to reason about their behavior. When a web page loads, the HTML and
JavaScript comprising the web application register JavaScript functions with the browser
to listen to specific events. When loading completes, JavaScript code will only run again in
response to listened-for events. This design obscures implicit and asynchronous control flow
edges caused by JavaScript interactions or HTML changes that trigger subsequent events.
Existing browser development tools provide limited assistance for understanding a web
application’s asynchronous behavior. The Chrome debugger’s asynchronous call stacks only
display a single causal chain leading to prior events, and the chain breaks when an event is
caused by a DOM modification. Browser-provided timeline tools log and display a wealth
of performance data, but cannot reason about asynchronous control flow. As a result, de-
velopers that wish to understand a web application’s asynchronous behavior must manually
examine the application’s code and executions to determine implicit control flow edges.
2.4 Porting Code to the Browser
Due to the unique nature of the browser environment, developers are unable to directly
compile or translate code written in conventional programming languages into JavaScript for
use in a web application. Conventional programming languages and their runtime libraries
expect access to primitives for multithreading and synchronous blocking I/O, as well as
access to operating system services like a file system, sockets, and processes. However, the
browser provides a completely different environment:
• Single-threaded Execution: JavaScript is a single-threaded event-driven program-
ming language with no support for interrupts. Events either execute to completion,
or until they are killed by the browser because they took too long to finish.
• Asynchronous-only APIs: Browsers provide web applications with a rich set of
functionality, but emerging APIs are exclusively asynchronous. Due to the limitations
of JavaScript, it is not possible to create synchronous APIs from asynchronous APIs.
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• Missing OS Services: Browsers do not provide applications with access to a file
system, socket, or process abstraction. Instead, they offer a panoply of incompatible
abstractions.
Developers wishing to port existing code to the web must manually restructure and rewrite
the code in JavaScript to adapt to these restrictions.
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CHAPTER 3
MCFLY: TIME-TRAVEL DEBUGGING FOR THE WEB
Web applications are challenging to debug. Time-traveling debuggers offer the promise
of simplifying debugging by letting developers freely step forwards and backwards through
a program’s execution. However, web applications present multiple challenges that make
time-travel debugging especially difficult. A time-traveling debugger for web applications
must accurately reproduce all network interactions, asynchronous events, and visual states
observed during the original execution, both while stepping forwards and backwards. This
must all be done in the context of a complex and highly multithreaded browser runtime. At
the same time, to be practical, a time-traveling debugger must maintain interactive speeds.
This chapter introduces McFly, the first time-traveling debugger for web applica-
tions. McFly departs from previous approaches by operating on a high-level represen-
tation of the browser’s internal state. This approach lets McFly provide accurate time-
travel debugging—maintaining JavaScript and visual state in sync at all times–at interactive
speeds. McFly’s architecture is browser-agnostic, building on web standards supported by
all major browsers. I have implemented McFly as an extension to the Microsoft Edge
browser, and core parts of McFly have been integrated into a time-traveling debugger
product from Microsoft [89].
3.1 McFly
McFly is a prototype time-traveling debugger for web applications. McFly operates
on a high-level representation of a browser’s internal state, letting it provide accurate time-
travel debugging with support for visual state at interactive speeds. This section presents
McFly’s architecture, which is browser-agnostic.
21
3.1.1 Time-Travel Overview
I first provide an overview of how a developer uses McFly to debug a web application,
which structures the remainder of this section.
Reproducing a bug: The developer loads the web application with McFly open, and
interacts with the application until they discover buggy behavior. While this happens,
McFly interacts with the layout engine via a combination of existing DOM interfaces and
custom extensions in order to support visual state during time-travel (§3.1.2). Specifically,
McFly creates checkpoints of the application’s program and visual state (§3.1.3) at a
configurable interval (2 seconds by default), and logs I/O and sources of nondeterminism
(§3.1.4). By regularly capturing checkpoints, McFly makes it possible to quickly time-
travel to an arbitrary point in the web application’s execution.
Debugging: When the developer encounters a bug, they can place and trigger a breakpoint
to begin a debugging session. At this point, the developer can use McFly to step forwards
and backwards through the captured program execution to diagnose the bug. To support
stepping forwards, McFly uses its log to deterministically replay the program execution.
Stepping backwards is more involved (§3.1.5), as McFly must return the application
to a previous state. To go back in time, McFly needs to return the application to a
target JavaScript statement s at a specific execution of the statement (at time t). To track
this information, McFly extends the JavaScript engine with the branch trace store and
timestamp store performance monitors (§3.1.6). McFly uses these performance monitors
to determine s and t.
Time-travel: To time-travel an application to statement s at time t, McFly loads the last
checkpoint taken before t and replays the log. When execution is at the JavaScript event
just prior to t, McFly enables the branch trace store and timestamp store, and places a
conditional breakpoint on s that triggers at time t. Conditional breakpoints are a standard
feature supported by all major JavaScript debuggers; the JavaScript engine will only trigger
the breakpoint if s executes at time t, which completes the time-travel operation.
Time-travel optimization: McFly opportunistically generates checkpoints during replay
to reduce the latency of future time travel operations. In particular, if McFly is time
traveling towards t, and must start from a “far-away” checkpoint (where distance is defined
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in terms of JavaScript events), McFly generates a new checkpoint at the JavaScript event
just prior to t. Thus, a sequence of stepping operations within the same JavaScript event
will use the new checkpoint; this is similar to an optimization by Boothe [20].
3.1.2 Supporting Visual State
McFly supports visual state during debugging by checkpointing and logging changes
to a high-level representation of the layout engine’s visual state. The layout engine already
reveals much of its internal state in a high-level form to the JavaScript engine via the
DOM. However, some of the layout engine’s internal state is not accessible via standard
interfaces, including the state of animations on the web page and lists of active event
listeners. McFly requires access to this state to be able to checkpoint and deterministically
re-execute applications.
McFly extends the layout engine with additional debugger-facing interfaces that pro-
vide read/write access to a high-level representation of internal layout engine state. These
extensions expose the same high-level state described in formal DOM specifications, which
all web browsers adhere to [56]. For example, the DOM specification for HTTP request
objects (XMLHttpRequest) describes network request objects as a state machine; McFly
captures these network requests in terms of the internal state machine. As a result, this
architecture is portable across all major web browsers. Section 4.3 details the specific ex-
tensions that the prototype version of McFly supports, as well as their implementation in
a widely-used browser.
3.1.3 Application Checkpoints
McFly’s web application checkpoints contain the application’s program state (from the
JavaScript engine) and visual state (from the layout engine). As these two types of state
are entangled through cross-references, McFly stores them together inside checkpoints as
a single object graph.
Program State: At a high level, the program state within the JavaScript engine consists
of the heap, the stack, and the program counter. However, the JavaScript engine does not
maintain a stack or a program counter between JavaScript events. In addition, JavaScript
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events are typically short-lived (under a few milliseconds in duration) because JavaScript
execution blocks UI interactions [112]; long-running events give the user the impression
that the application is frozen. This property is enforced by the web browser; if a JavaScript
event runs for too long, the browser crashes the tab or raises an alert.
McFly defers application checkpoints to occur between JavaScript events. This de-
sign constrains where McFly can checkpoint the application, but does not unduly impact
debugging performance since most events complete in under a millisecond.
This design ensures that the only program state that McFly needs to capture is the
JavaScript heap, which all major web browsers can efficiently traverse using existing garbage
collection routines. When the traversal encounters an object in the heap that reflects and
retains visual state in the layout engine, McFly serializes its high-level state. To reinstate
checkpointed program state, McFly uses internal interfaces present in all major JavaScript
engines to reconstruct serialized objects.
Visual State: A web application’s visual state consists of active GUI nodes on the webpage,
inactive GUI nodes stored in the JavaScript heap, active CSS animations, browser-local
persistent storage, the state of the random number generator, event listeners, the number
of bytes consumed by each active HTML parser, and the state of network requests. McFly
serializes a high-level representation of these resources into the checkpoint’s object graph
using a combination of standard web interfaces and the extensions discussed in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.4 I/O and Nondeterminism Log
McFly logs I/O and sources of nondeterminism that it uses to ensure that stepping
operations are deterministic. The log contains different types of entries, which each have a
different logging and replay strategy. I describe each type of log entry below; Section 4.3
details which DOM interfaces use which strategy.
Simple entries correspond to synchronous interactions between JavaScript and the layout
engine, such as querying for the date, that depend on browser-external state. McFly logs
these values during the original execution, and replays them while debugging.
Event entries correspond to JavaScript events. McFly uses these to ensure that JavaScript
events occur in the same order as the developer steps through the program. During the
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original execution, McFly logs a high-level form of each event as it occurs. At debug time,
McFly replays events from the log. This replay strategy reproduces event races observed
during the original execution.
Inter-event visual state updates occur between JavaScript events. While JavaScript is
executing, the layout engine defers certain visual state updates. For example, layout engines
only transition the internal state machine of HTTP request objects in quiescent periods
between events. During the original execution, McFly scans for and logs state changes for
the relevant high-level state before every JavaScript event. During replay, McFly applies
the logged updates before the same event in order to keep the state in sync with JavaScript
execution.
Concurrent visual state updates occur while JavaScript is executing. The layout engine
updates some visual state, such as CSS animations, concurrent with JavaScript execution.
Every time JavaScript code synchronously interacts with the layout engine, McFly scans
for and logs any changes to concurrently updated state. During replay, McFly prevents
the layout engine from concurrently updating state and re-applies the state changes itself
during the same synchronous interaction, which keeps the state in sync with JavaScript
execution.
McFly uses a counter of synchronous interactions to denote a specific synchronous
interaction in the log, and stores the counter value in checkpoints. For example, a log
entry with counter value 60 would be applied during the 60th synchronous layout engine
interaction, which will be identical across deterministic replays. This strategy preserves
any data races between JavaScript code and the layout engine observed during the original
execution.
3.1.5 Debugger Features
McFly provides a full suite of complements to existing debugger features, and exposes
this functionality as an extension to a production JavaScript stepping debugger. I only
discuss step backwards in this section; the remaining features are implemented similarly.
Step backwards complements step forwards, and lets the developer return to the previously-
executed program statement. Given that the debugger is paused at the statement s at logical
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time t = (c, b), where c is the number of times the function has been called since enabling
performance monitoring and b is the number of backwards jumps (loop iterations) executed
in the current function call, the debugger must determine the statement and logical time of
the previously-executed statement, s′ and t′:
• If s is not the entry point of a basic block, then s′ is the previous statement in the
block and t′ = t.
• If s is the entry point of a basic block, then s′ is the source statement of the previously
taken branch.
– If s′ is the current statement in the calling function, then t′ is the logical time
associated with the caller’s call frame.
– Otherwise, s′ is from the same function call as s. If s′ is a loop header (e.g.,
while(someCondition)), then s′ is from a previous loop iteration and t′ = (c, b−1).
Otherwise, t′ = t.
Finally, McFly places a conditional breakpoint on s′ that triggers when the logical time is
t′, and replays the program from the previous checkpoint that is closest to the target logical
time. If the checkpoint is not close to the target time, McFly records a new checkpoint just
before the target JavaScript event in order to speed up subsequent step-back operations.
3.1.6 Performance Monitors
To replay execution to a specific statement at a particular point in time, time-traveling
debuggers need visibility into the current execution. VM-based time-traveling debuggers
typically use performance counters on the processor for this purpose [59, 84], but managed
languages, like JavaScript, lack comparable functionality.
McFly augments the JavaScript engine with two performance monitors. The branch
trace store contains the last branch instruction that was taken by each function that is cur-
rently on the call stack. The timestamp store contains the timestamp of each function on the
call stack. A timestamp is represented as the pair of the function’s call count since enabling
performance monitoring and the number of backwards jumps (loop iterations) executed
thus far in the function call. For example, given the function function a(){while(true){}},
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the timestamp (3, 2) represents the second iteration of the loop during the third call to the
function.
3.1.7 Replay Guarantees
McFly guarantees that replay is identical to the original execution, including the data
returned from supported layout engine interfaces, the sequence of application-observed
JavaScript events, and the pixels on the screen. Animations may not move smoothly dur-
ing replay, as the system fast-forwards animations to each observed state from the original
execution whenever JavaScript code calls into the layout engine, but the JavaScript code
will observe the same values seen in the original execution. In addition, developers can use
existing debugging tools, such as the DOM Explorer shown in Figure 1.2, to inspect the
GUI while debugging.
3.2 Implementation
I have implemented a prototype of McFly in the Microsoft Edge web browser. This
section describes in detail the changes I made to the layout engine to support McFly’s
checkpoints and logs (§3.2.1), the changes to the JavaScript engine to support performance
monitors (§3.2.2), and the security implications of these changes (§3.2.3).
3.2.1 Layout Engine State
Below, I walk through how the prototype implementation of McFly captures the high-
level layout engine state described in Table 3.1. Although the table lists many different
resources, I only need to make a small number of modifications to the layout engine because
standard browser interfaces already make a large amount of high-level state available to the
debugger.
Random numbers: JavaScript applications use Math.random() to generate random num-
bers, but cannot read or write the internal state of the PRNG. I modify the layout engine to
let McFly query and reset the PRNG’s state. McFly stores the PRNG state in program
checkpoints, and reinstates it prior to replaying from a checkpoint.
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Resource Interface High-level
State
Logged Data Log Entries
Random Math.random() PRNG state None
Numbers
Time Date Internal times-
tamps
Current time Simple entries
Timers setTimeout,
setInterval
Active timers Timer IDs Simple entries
Events EventTarget Active event listen-
ers
None
Indirect None Sequence of events Event entries
GUI DOM Live DOM nodes Form changes, Inter-event updates
external resource
loads,
Concurrent updates
HTML parsing
progress
Concurrent updates
CSS Anima-
tions
Animation status Animation advance-
ment
Concurrent updates
Network
Requests
XMLHttpRequest State machine State machine
changes
Inter-event updates
Storage localStorage,
Cookies
Contents of stor-
age
None
Table 3.1: The core browser interfaces that McFly supports. The table above summarizes
the different resources that the browser’s layout engine provides to JavaScript code, the high-
level representation of their internal state, the data that McFly records into its log, and
the types of log entries used. In the “interface” column, Indirect means that a program’s
interactions with the resource are implicit, i.e., the interactions do not use an explicit
JavaScript interface.
Current time: The layout engine contains a Date interface that lets programs observe the
current time as a Date object, which it queries from the OS. I modify the layout engine to
let McFly log and replay date requests. To serialize Date objects into checkpoints, I use
the existing getTime() function on the object to retrieve its timestamp.
Timer status: JavaScript applications create one-shot timers via setTimeout(), and recur-
ring timers via setInterval(). Each timer is assigned a unique ID that the layout engine
arbitrarily determines. The layout engine does not provide an interface for enumerating the
set of active timers or for controlling their IDs. I extend the layout engine to expose the set
of active timers and to let McFly log and replay timer ID assignments. I use the former
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modification to store active timers in checkpoints, and the latter to deterministically replay
timer IDs. McFly deterministically replays the timer schedule as discussed under sequence
of events.
Events: JavaScript code can register functions as handlers for events. For example, a pro-
gram can register handlers for mouse click events. Applications can register event listeners
in three ways: through properties on HTML tags (e.g., <div onclick="a()">), properties
on the DOM elements (e.g., div.onclick=a;), or through the addEventListener() DOM
interface (e.g., div.addEventListener(’click’,a)). JavaScript code can enumerate event
listeners registered using the first two approaches, since the listeners are reflected as prop-
erties on the associated DOM objects. However, the layout engine does not let JavaScript
code enumerate handlers which were registered via addEventListener(). Furthermore, the
layout engine dispatches events to event handlers in the order in which the handlers were
registered, regardless of the registration technique employed. The layout engine does not
expose this order, which must be recreated at replay time.
All DOM objects that generate events implement the EventTarget interface. I modify the
layout engine to let McFly enumerate all event handler information that is associated with
an EventTarget. McFly uses this extension to store handler orders into checkpoints, and
restore handler orders from checkpoints using the preexisting handler registration interfaces.
Sequence of events: Each JavaScript execution context is single-threaded and completely
event-driven, but the layout engine contains and controls the JavaScript event queue. The
layout engine does not expose the queue to JavaScript code, but events must be replayed
in the same order as the original execution in order to reproduce event races. I extend the
layout engine to let McFly intercept events added to the event queue, which it uses to log
and reproduce the original event order during a debugging session.
GUI: JavaScript code interacts with the GUI through the DOM tree. Each HTML tag on
a web page has a corresponding element object in the tree. Each element object provides
JavaScript code with read and write access to tag-specific state, such as the URL for an
<img> tag or the text in a form field. I use existing JavaScript interfaces to serialize and
deserialize the entirety of the DOM tree into checkpoints.
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External resources: A web page often includes external objects, e.g., HTML tags which
specify a src attribute and whose content must be fetched from remote servers. The layout
engine loads this content in parallel with JavaScript execution on an I/O thread. When the
content finishes loading, the layout engine silently updates the applicable HTML element
with attributes, such as the height and width of an image. I modify the layout engine to
let McFly log and replay network fetches.
HTML parsing progress: A web page contains one or more HTML documents, with
secondary HTML documents appearing in frames. The browser incrementally loads and
parses HTML documents in parallel with JavaScript execution, which causes new nodes to
appear in the DOM. I extend the layout engine to expose the current byte offset in each
document’s parse stream. McFly logs offset changes during the original execution. During
replay, McFly feeds the network stack the new bytes at the appropriate time (via the
extension discussed in external resources) and waits for the parser to consume them.
CSS animations: The DOM does not expose the CSS animation state of an HTML
tag—that state resides within the layout engine. If McFly cannot read CSS animation
state, then it cannot record an animation’s progress with respect to concurrently executing
JavaScript code; this would prevent McFly from faithfully recreating the behavior. To
enable high-fidelity replays of animations, I modify the layout engine to let McFly read
and write the frame counts corresponding to active CSS animations. Using this interface,
McFly can “seek” to a specific point in the animation, and keep it synchronized with
JavaScript execution.
Connection status: JavaScript applications communicate with remote servers via XMLHttp-
Request objects. Each object encapsulates the state of a single HTTP request. At logging
time, the debugger can observe the state of each request, including the content of the
HTTP response, using existing methods on XMLHttpRequest objects. The debugger needs
a mechanism to recreate logged XMLHttpRequest objects without creating actual network
connections. I extend the layout engine to let the debugger create XMLHttpRequest objects
from scratch, and set their internal state to arbitrary values.
Storage: Web applications manage persistent local data using cookies and the localStorage
interface [55, 56]. Both mechanisms export a key/value API. The layout engine creates a
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separate storage area for each origin, and prevents different origins from accessing each
other’s data. A page’s origin is the 3-tuple of the protocol, hostname, and port in the
page’s URL. Since all of the active origins on a web page execute within the same JavaScript
engine, McFly can pose as any origin and manipulate its storage using the same interfaces
that are exposed to regular applications.
Additional browser features: McFly supports a core set of browser interfaces, which
is sufficient to time-travel many existing web applications. Browsers regularly add new
features, such as WebGL and Web Audio, that McFly does not support. McFly can be
extended to support these features with additional browser modifications to expose their
hidden state.
3.2.2 Performance Monitors
For simplicity, I implement the branch trace store and timestamp store by augmenting
the browser’s JavaScript interpreter. When a performance monitor is enabled, I disable the
browser’s JIT compiler, forcing JavaScript execution to use the interpreter. As I mention
in Section 3.1.1, McFly only requires performance monitoring when a replayed execution
nears a target line of interest, so this design has minimal performance impact.
3.2.3 Security Implications
The layout engine modifications described in §3.2.1 are only exposed to debugging tools.
They are not accessible to web applications via public JavaScript APIs. These modifications
do not affect the security model for web content—at logging time and during replay, browsers
still use the same-origin policy to isolate content.
3.3 Evaluation
I evaluate McFly by running it on a corpus of web applications. The evaluation ad-
dresses the following questions:
• Faithfulness: Does McFly faithfully and deterministically re-execute web applica-
tions?
• Performance: Does McFly support time-travel debugging at interactive speeds?
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• Overhead: Does McFly impose acceptable overhead during normal web application
execution?
I performed the evaluation on a desktop with a quad-core Intel Xeon E5-1620 clocked at
3.6 GHz with 16GB of RAM and a 7200 RPM SATA hard drive.
3.3.1 Applications
There are no established benchmark suites for time-traveling debuggers for web applica-
tions, so I collected one. To perform a controlled evaluation, I chose applications for which
I had source code and that I could run locally in a non-production setting. Conducting
performance experiments on web applications running in production poses severe method-
ological challenges. Every experiment is likely to capture a different version of the web
application, due to updates or A/B testing, and with different content. For example, Face-
book regularly conducts experiments on its users that changes the code and presentation of
the website, and Facebook’s feed contains different advertisements, posts, and third-party
code across visits. While I did not use production applications in this evaluation, I have
verified that McFly works on production websites.
I focus the qualitative and quantitative evaluation on benchmarks that exercise different
components of McFly:
• Delta-Blue, Earley-Boyer, RayTrace, and Splay are from the Octane benchmark
suite [42], and are memory intensive workloads that stress McFly’s checkpoints. I
modify the benchmarks to extend their runtime to ∼10 seconds to isolate McFly
overhead from parsing/JIT warmup overhead. Unlike the other benchmarks, these
programs have no I/O and are deterministic; I exclude these benchmarks from parts
of the performance evaluation that use McFly’s nondeterminism and I/O log.
• RayTrace (GUI) [23] is the RayTrace program from the Octane benchmark suite with
its original HTML GUI, which introduces I/O to the program.
• ColorGame [62] is an implementation of a test that demonstrates the Stroop ef-
fect [120]. It uses AngularJS and jQuery, which are both complicated and commonly
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used libraries, and result in ColorGame having ∼3× as much code as the next largest
benchmark. AngularJS exercises a wide variety of DOM features, and encodes crucial
application data into the DOM directly. Thus, it is crucial that McFly correctly
support this application’s visual state during debugging sessions.
• CRUD is a standard content management interface that uses jQuery to manage its
user interface. CRUD uses HTML forms to let users create, update, and delete con-
tent, which McFly must correctly support for debugging to be deterministic.
• PacMan [149] is an implementation of the classic Pac-Man game using the HTML5
canvas. It uses timers to update the contents of the canvas every 80ms, and stresses
McFly’s ability to quickly serialize large DOM objects into checkpoints and log fre-
quent events.
Table 3.2 describes the code size of each of these benchmarks, including HTML documents
and JavaScript libraries.
3.3.2 Faithfulness
I evaluated the faithfulness of McFly’s time-travel debugging by using McFly to debug
the benchmark applications. While using breakpoints and McFly’s stepping operations,
I observed each application’s visual and program states, and checked that it matched the
original execution.
I manually verified that, across all of the benchmarks, McFly faithfully and deter-
ministically reproduces the program and visual states observed during the origi-
nal execution. Using McFly, I was able to deterministically step forwards and backwards
through web application executions while visual state updates, including those induced by
CSS animations and network dependencies, remained synchronized with JavaScript execu-
tion.
3.3.3 Performance
In order to be useful, McFly must step through an execution of a web at interac-
tive speeds. While stepping forwards is straightforward and involves deterministic replay,
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Proc. Checkpoint
Program Code Size Create Write Resume Size Gzipped
Color-Game 746 KB 44 MB 0.12 s 0.12 s 0.43 s 3.3 MB 0.9 MB
CRUD 250 KB 28 MB 0.11 s 0.10 s 0.37 s 2.4 MB 0.5 MB
Delta-Blue 36 KB 34 MB 0.09 s 0.17 s 0.36 s 2.1 MB 0.4 MB
Earley-Boyer 244 KB 123 MB 0.09 s 0.11 s 0.30 s 3.3 MB 0.6 MB
PacMan 50 KB 31 MB 0.13 s 0.14 s 0.45 s 2.2 MB 0.5 MB
RayTrace 38 KB 73 MB 0.06 s 0.09 s 0.28 s 2.1 MB 0.4 MB
Splay 17 KB 538 MB 0.08 s 0.10 s 0.33 s 2.3 MB 0.5 MB
Average 197 KB 124 MB 0.10 s 0.12 s 0.36 s 2.5 MB 0.5 MB
Table 3.2: McFly’s checkpoint performance. McFly takes a fraction of a second to create
or restore a checkpoint. Checkpoints are also significantly smaller than the size of the
browser process they capture.
Program Overhead Startup
Color-Game 4% 4.5 s
CRUD 0% 3.2 s
PacMan 6% 4.7 s
RayTrace (GUI) 5% 2.9 s
Average 4% 3.8 s
Table 3.3: McFly’s reverse-debugging overhead. Overall, McFly imposes low overhead
on the benchmark applications (up to 6% w/ checkpoints every 2 seconds) and requires a
short one-time startup cost to initialize efficient reverse-step debugging.
stepping backwards in time involves more costly operations. Specifically, stepping back-
wards involves resuming execution from the nearest checkpoint and playing forwards to
the JavaScript statement of interest. In addition, the first time the developer steps back-
wards, the debugger creates a checkpoint just prior to the JavaScript event that executes
the statement of interest.
McFly’s step backwards overhead has two components:
• Startup Cost: The first time the developer steps backwards, McFly replays the
execution from the nearest checkpoint and creates a new checkpoint just prior to the
JavaScript event of interest.
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• Resuming Execution from Checkpoint: Once the startup cost is paid, the cost of
subsequent step backwards operations within the same JavaScript event is dominated
by the time to resume from the newly created checkpoint.
I drive each benchmark through a fixed series of events using a PowerShell script that
provides application inputs. Each script lasts approximately 10 seconds. I run all bench-
mark programs and checkpoint their state every second for the checkpoint cost evaluation
in order to collect more data points, and every two seconds for the startup cost evaluation
to reflect a more representative value for everyday usage. I calculate the average time to
resume from a checkpoint (from disk), and the time to take the first backwards step from
10 random breakpoints. From the results, I observe the following:
McFly’s stepping operations run at interactive speeds in the common case. After
paying a one-time startup fee, the time to execute a backwards step in McFly is dominated
by the time it takes to resume from the nearest checkpoint (0.36s on average, as shown in
Table 3.2).
McFly imposes an acceptable backwards step startup cost. This startup cost is,
on average, 3.8 seconds on the benchmark applications or roughly twice the checkpoint rate
(Table 3.3).
3.3.4 Overhead
To be usable, McFly must not impose significant time and space overheads during
normal web application execution. The following metrics contribute to McFly’s runtime
and space overheads:
• Log Growth: The growth rate of the nondeterminism and I/O log. Since a fast-
growing log will exhaust disk and memory resources, this metric bounds the practical
duration of program executions that McFly can support.
• Checkpoint Size: The size of application checkpoints, which McFly takes at a
regular and configurable interval during the original execution. If checkpoints are
large, then it will be impractical to take frequent checkpoints, which increases the
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Program Log Growth
Color-Game 0.6 KB/s
CRUD 0.2 KB/s
PacMan 1.5 KB/s
RayTrace (GUI) 0.9 KB/s
Average 0.8 KB/s
Figure 3.1: McFly’s log overhead. McFly’s uncompressed nondeterminism and I/O log
grows slowly.
initial cost return to a specific point in an execution. The compressed size indicates
the checkpoint’s size on disk when compressed with gzip.
• Checkpoint Creation Time: The amount of time it takes to create a checkpoint.
If it takes a long time to create a checkpoint, then McFly will induce noticeable
slowdowns during the initial execution of the program.
To measure these, I again drive each benchmark through a fixed series of events using
a PowerShell script for approximately 10 seconds. For checkpoint operations, I run each
benchmark in a configuration that takes a checkpoint every second. For log growth, I run
each benchmark without taking any checkpoints, maximizing log size. For overall overhead
during a normal execution, I measure the runtime of each benchmark in a configuration
that takes a checkpoint every two seconds, the default configuration, and compare with the
benchmark’s runtime without McFly.
As Table 3.2 shows, checkpoint creation takes less than an eighth of a second on the
benchmark applications. McFly takes an average of 100 milliseconds to create a checkpoint
and 120 milliseconds to serialize the checkpoint to disk. McFly’s checkpoint operations
are fast enough to support frequent checkpoints with acceptable overhead.
McFly checkpoints compress to less than a megabyte on the benchmark applica-
tions (Table 3.2). McFly checkpoints contain the web application’s complete state as a
lightweight high-level representation that is amenable to compression. Compressed McFly
checkpoints are two orders of magnitude smaller than the browser’s memory footprint at
the process-level.
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McFly’s nondeterminism and I/O log grows at less than 2KB/s (Figure 3.1). The
benchmark with the most nondeterminism, PacMan, has the largest log growth rate of
1.5KB/s. At that rate, McFly could record PacMan’s execution for over 11 years on a
500GB hard drive.
With checkpoints every two seconds, McFly’s overall overhead is 4% on average
on the benchmark applications (Table 3.3). In some cases, such as CRUD, McFly imposes
no overhead because checkpoints occur between JavaScript events, when the application is
waiting for user input. McFly can impose even lower runtime overheads in exchange for
longer step backwards startup costs with a lower checkpoint rate during execution.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented McFly, the first time-traveling debugger for web applications.
McFly provides accurate time-travel debugging that maintains JavaScript and visual state
in sync at all times. I show that McFly lets developers freely step forwards and backwards
through a web application’s execution at interactive speed. Core parts of McFly have been
incorporated into a time-traveling debugger product from Microsoft.
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CHAPTER 4
BLEAK: AUTOMATICALLY DEBUGGING MEMORY LEAKS IN
WEB APPLICATIONS
Despite the presence of garbage collection in managed languages like JavaScript, mem-
ory leaks remain a serious problem. In the context of web applications, these leaks are
especially pervasive and difficult to debug. Web application memory leaks can take many
forms, including failing to dispose of unneeded event listeners, repeatedly injecting iframes
and CSS files, and failing to call cleanup routines in third-party libraries. Leaks degrade
responsiveness by increasing GC frequency and overhead, and can even lead to browser
tab crashes by exhausting available memory. Because previous leak detection approaches
designed for conventional C, C++ or Java applications are ineffective in the browser envi-
ronment, tracking down leaks currently requires intensive manual effort by web developers.
This chapter introduces BLeak (Browser Leak debugger), the first system for auto-
matically debugging memory leaks in web applications. BLeak leverages the following fact:
over a single session, users repeatedly return to the same visual state in modern web sites,
such as Facebook, Airbnb, and Gmail. For example, Facebook users repeatedly return to
the news feed, Airbnb users repeatedly return to the page listing all properties in a given
area, and Gmail users repeatedly return to the inbox view.
I observe that these round trips can be viewed as an oracle to identify leaks. Because
visits to the same (approximate) visual state should consume roughly the same amount of
memory, sustained memory growth between visits is a strong indicator of a memory leak.
BLeak builds directly on this observation to find memory leaks in web applications, which
(as §7.3 shows) are both widespread and severe.
To use BLeak, a developer provides a short script (17–73 LOC on our benchmarks)
to drive a web application in a loop that takes round trips through a specific visual state.
BLeak then proceeds automatically, identifying memory leaks, ranking them, and locating
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their root cause in the source code. BLeak first uses heap differencing to locate locations in
the heap with sustained growth between each round trip, which it identifies as leak roots. To
directly identify the root causes of growth, BLeak employs JavaScript rewriting to target
leak roots and collect stack traces when they grow. Finally, when presenting the results to
the developer, BLeak ranks leak roots by return on investment using a novel metric called
LeakShare that prioritizes memory leaks that free the most memory with the least effort by
dividing the “credit” for retaining a shared leaked object equally among the leak roots that
retain them. This ranking focuses developer effort on the most important memory leaks
first.
Guided by BLeak, I identify and fix over 50 memory leaks in popular JavaScript li-
braries and applications including Airbnb, AngularJS, jQuery, Google Analytics, and the
Google Maps SDK. BLeak has a median precision of 100% (97% on average). Its precise
identification of root causes of leaks makes it relatively straightforward for us to fix nearly
all of the leaks I identify (all but one). Fixing these leaks reduces heap growth by 94%
on average, saving from 0.5 MB to 8 MB per return trip to the same visual state. I have
submitted patches for all of these leaks to the application developers; at the time of writing,
16 have already been accepted and 4 are in the process of code review.
4.1 BLeak Overview
This section presents an overview of the techniques BLeak uses to automatically detect,
rank, and diagnose memory leaks. I illustrate these by showing how to use BLeak to debug
the Firefox memory leak presented in Section 2.2.
Input script: Developers provide BLeak with a simple script that drives a web application
in a loop through specific visual states. A visual state is the resting state of the GUI after
the user takes an action, such as clicking on a link or submitting a form. The developer
specifies the loop as an array of objects, where each object represents a specific visual state,
comprising (1) a check function that checks the preconditions for being in that state, and
(2) a transition function next that interacts with the page to navigate to the next visual
state in the loop. The final visual state in the loop array transitions back to the first,
forming a loop.
39
1 exports.loop = [
2 // Open a source document
3 {
4 check: function() {
5 const nodes = $('.node');
6 // No documents are open
7 return $('.source-tab').length === 0 &&
8 // Target doc appears in doc list
9 nodes.length > 1 && nodes[1].innerText === "main.js";
10 },
11 next: function() { $('.node')[1].click(); }
12 },
13 // Close the document after it loads
14 {
15 check: function() {
16 // Contents of main.js are in editor
17 return $('.CodeMirror-line').length > 2 &&
18 // Editor displays tab for main.js
19 $('.source-tab').length === 1 &&
20 // Tab contains a close button
21 $('.close-btn').length === 1;
22 },
23 next: function() { $('.close-btn').click(); }
24 }];
Figure 4.1: BLeak input. This script runs the Firefox debugger in a loop, and is the only
input BLeak requires to automatically locate memory leaks. For brevity, I modify the
script to use jQuery syntax.
Figure 4.1 presents a loop for the Firefox debugger that opens and closes a source file in
the debugger’s text editor. The first visual state occurs when there are no tabs open in the
editor (line 7), and the application has loaded the list of documents in the application it is
debugging (line 9); this is the default state of the debugger when it first loads. Once the
application is in that first visual state, the loop transitions the application to the second
visual state by clicking on main.js in the list of documents to open it in the text editor
(line 11). The application reaches the second visible state once the debugger displays the
contents of main.js (line 17). The loop then closes the tab containing main.js (line 23),
transitioning back to the first visual state.
Locating leaks: From this point, BLeak proceeds entirely automatically. BLeak uses the
developer-provided script to drive the web application in a loop. Because object instances
can change from snapshot to snapshot, BLeak tracks paths instead of objects, letting it
spot leaks even when a variable or object property is regularly updated with a new and
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larger object. For example, history = history.concat(newItems) overwrites history with
a new and larger array.
After each visit to the first visual state in the loop, BLeak takes a heap snapshot and
tracks specific paths from GC roots that are continually growing. BLeak treats a path as
growing if the object identified by that path gains more outgoing references (e.g., when an
array expands or when properties are added to an object).
For the Firefox debugger, BLeak notices four heap paths that are growing each round
trip: (1) an array within the codeMirror object that contains scroll event listeners, and
internal browser event listener lists for (2) mouseover, (3) mouseup, and (4) mousedown events
on the DOM element containing the text editor. Since these objects continue to grow over
multiple loop iterations (the default setting is eight), BLeak marks these items as leak roots
as they appear to be growing without bound.
Ranking leaks: BLeak uses the final heap snapshot and the list of leak roots to rank
leaks by return on investment using a novel but intuitive metric I call LeakShare (§4.2.3)
that prioritizes memory leaks that free the most memory with the least effort. LeakShare
prunes objects in the graph reachable by non-leak roots, and then splits the credit for
remaining objects equally among the leak roots that retain them. Unlike retained size (a
standard metric used by all existing heap snapshot tools), which only considers objects
uniquely owned by leak roots, LeakShare correctly distributes the credit for the leaked
Preview objects among the four different leak roots since they all must be removed to
eliminate the leak.
Diagnosing leaks: BLeak next reloads the application and uses its proxy to transparently
rewrite all of the JavaScript on the page, exposing otherwise-hidden edges in the heap as
object properties. BLeak uses JavaScript reflection to instrument identified leak roots to
capture stack traces when they grow and when they are overwritten (not just where they
were allocated). With this instrumentation in place, BLeak uses the developer-provided
script to run one final iteration of the loop to collect stack traces. These stack traces directly
zero in on the code responsible for leak growth.
Output: Finally, BLeak outputs its diagnostic report: a ranked list of leak roots (ordered
by LeakShare), together with the heap paths that retain them and stack traces responsible
41
Figure 4.2: BLeak output. A snippet from BLeak’s memory leak report for the Firefox
debugger. Clicking on a memory leak reveals a list of stack traces, and clicking on a stack
frame navigates the source code viewer to the relevant JavaScript statement. BLeak points
directly to the code in Figure 2.1 responsible for the memory leak.
for their growth. BLeak displays this information interactively to the developer via a web
application; Figure 4.2 displays a screenshot of BLeak’s output for the Firefox debugger,
which points directly to the code responsible for the memory leak from Figure 2.1.
Summary: Using BLeak, the only developer effort required is creating a short script
to drive the web application in a loop. BLeak then locates memory leaks and provides
detailed information pointing to the source code responsible. With this information in hand,
I was able to discover four new memory leaks in the Firefox debugger, and quickly develop
a fix that removes the event listeners when the user closes the document. This fix has been
incorporated in the latest version of the debugger.
4.2 Algorithms
This section formally describes the operation of BLeak’s core algorithms for detecting
(§4.2.1), diagnosing (§4.2.2), and ranking leaks (§4.2.3).
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4.2.1 Memory Leak Detection
The input to BLeak’s memory leak detection algorithm is a set of heap snapshots
collected during the same visual state, and the output is a set of paths from GC roots that
are growing across all snapshots. I call these paths leak roots. BLeak considers a path
to be growing if the object at that path has more outgoing references than it did in the
previous snapshot. To make the algorithm tractable, BLeak only considers the shortest
path to each specific heap item.
Each heap snapshot contains a heap graph G = (N,E) with a set of nodes N that
represent items in the heap, and edges E where each edge (n1, n2, l) ∈ E represents a
reference from node n1 to n2 with label l. A label l is a tuple containing the type and name
of the edge. Each edge’s type is either a closure variable or an object property. An edge’s
name corresponds to the name of the closure variable or object property. For example, the
object O = { foo: 3 } has an edge e from O to the number 3 with label l = (property, “foo”).
A path P is simply a list of edges (e1, e2, . . . , en) where e1 is an edge from the root node
(G.root).1
For the first heap snapshot, BLeak conservatively marks every node as growing. For
subsequent snapshots, BLeak runs PropagateGrowth (Figure 4.3) to propagate the
growth flags from the previous snapshot to the new snapshot, and discards the previous
snapshot. On line 2, PropagateGrowth initializes every node in the new graph to not
growing to prevent spuriously marking new growth as growing in the next run of the al-
gorithm. Since the algorithm only considers paths that are the shortest path to a specific
node, it is able to associate growth information with the terminal node which represents a
specific path in the heap.
PropagateGrowth runs a breadth-first traversal across shared paths in the two
graphs, starting from the root node that contains the global scope (window) and the DOM.
The algorithm marks a node in the new graph as growing if the node at the same path in
the previous graph is both growing and has fewer outgoing edges (line 8). As a result, the
1For simplicity, I describe heap graphs as having a single root.
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PropagateGrowth(G,G′)
1 Q = [(G.root , G′.root)], G′.root .mark = true
2 for each node n ∈ G′.N
3 n.growing = false
4 while |Q| > 0
5 (n, n′) = Dequeue(Q)
6 En = GetOutgoingEdges(G,n)
7 E′n = GetOutgoingEdges(G′, n′)
8 n′.growing = n.growing ∧ |En| < |E′n|
9 for each edge (n1, n2, l) ∈ En
10 for each edge (n′1, n′2, l′) ∈ E′n
11 if l == l′ and n′2.mark == false
12 n′2.mark = true
13 Enqueue((n2, n
′
2))
Figure 4.3: PropagateGrowth algorithm. PropagateGrowth propagates a node’s
growth status (n.growing) between heap snapshots. BLeak considers a path in the heap
to be growing if the node at the path continually increases its number of outgoing edges.
algorithm will only mark a heap path as a leak root if it consistently grows between every
snapshot, and if it has been present since the first snapshot.
PropagateGrowth only visits paths shared between the two graphs (line 11). At a
given path, the algorithm considers an outgoing edge en in the old graph and e
′
n in the
new graph as equivalent if they have the same label. In other words, the edges have to
correspond to the same property name on the object at that path, or a closure variable
with the same name captured by the function at that path.
After propagating growth flags to the final heap snapshot, BLeak runs FindLeak-
Paths (Figure 4.4) to record growing paths in the heap. This traversal visits edges in
the graph to capture the shortest path to all unique edges that point to growing nodes.
For example, if a growing object O is located at window.O and as variable p in the func-
tion window.L.z, FindLeakPaths will report both paths. This property is important for
diagnosing leaks, as I discuss in Section 4.2.2.
BLeak takes the output of FindLeakPaths and groups it by the terminal node of
each path. Each group corresponds to a specific leak root. This set of leak roots forms the
input to the ranking algorithm.
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FindLeakPaths(G)
1 Q = [], TGr = {}
2 for each edge e = (n1, n2, l) ∈ G.E where n1 == G.root
3 e.mark = true
4 Enqueue(Q, (nil, e))
5 while |Q| > 0
6 t = Dequeue(Q)
7 (tp, (n1, n2, l)) = t
8 if n2.growing == true
9 TGr = TGr ∪ {t}
10 for each edge e = (n′1, n′2, l′) ∈ G.E
11 if n′1 == n2 and e.mark == false
12 e.mark = true
13 Enqueue(Q, (t, e))
14 return TGr
Figure 4.4: FindLeakPaths algorithm. FindLeakPaths returns paths through the heap
to leaking nodes. The algorithm encodes each path as a list of edges formed by tuples (t).
4.2.2 Diagnosing Leaks
Given a list of leak roots and, for each root, a list of heap paths that point to the root,
BLeak diagnoses leaks through hooks that run whenever the application performs any of
the following actions:
• Grows a leak root with a new item. This growth occurs when the application adds a
property to an object, an element to an array, an event listener to an event target, or
a child node to a DOM node. BLeak captures a stack trace, and associates it with
the new item.
• Shrinks a leak root by removing any of the previously-mentioned items. BLeak
removes any stack traces associated with the removed items, as the items are no
longer contributing to the leak root’s growth.
• Assigns a new value to a leak root, which typically occurs when the application copies
the state from an old version of the leaking object into a new version. BLeak re-
moves all previously-collected stack traces for the leak root, collects a new stack trace,
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CalculateLeakShare(G,LR)
1 Q = [G.root ], visitId = 0
2 for each node n ∈ G.N
3 n.mark = −1
4 while |Q| > 0
5 n = Dequeue(Q)
6 if n /∈ LR and n.mark 6= visitId
7 n.mark = visitId
8 for each edge (n1, n2, l) ∈ G.E where n1 == n
9 Enqueue(Q,n2)
10 for each node nroot ∈ LR
11 visitId += 1
12 Q = [nroot]
13 while |Q| > 0
14 n = Dequeue(Q)
15 if n.mark 6= 0 and n.mark 6= visitId
16 n.mark = visitId
17 n.counter = n.counter + 1
18 for each (n1, n2, l) ∈ G.E where n1 == n
19 Enqueue(Q,n2)
20 for each node nroot ∈ LR
21 visitId += 1
22 Q = [nroot]
23 while |Q| > 0
24 n = Dequeue(Q)
25 if n.counter 6= 0 and n.mark 6= visitId
26 n.mark = visitId
27 nroot.LS += n.size/n.counter
28 for each (n1, n2, l) ∈ G.E where n1 == n
29 Enqueue(Q,n2)
Figure 4.5: CalculateLeakShare algorithm. CalculateLeakShare calculates the
LeakShare metric (n.LS ) for a set of leak roots LR.
associates it with all of the items in the new value, and inserts the grow and shrink
hooks into the new value.
BLeak runs one loop iteration of the application with all hooks installed. This process
generates a list of stack traces responsible for growing each leak root.
4.2.3 Leak Root Ranking
BLeak uses a new metric to rank leak roots by return on investment that I call Leak-
Share (Figure 4.5). LeakShare prioritizes memory leaks that free the most memory with
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the least effort by dividing the “credit” for retaining a shared leaked object equally among
the leak roots that retain them.
LeakShare first marks all of the items in the heap that are reachable from non-leaks
via a breadth-first traversal that stops at leak roots (line 4). These nodes are ignored
by subsequent traversals. Then, LeakShare performs a breadth-first traversal from each
leak root that increments a counter on all reachable nodes (line 10). Once this process is
complete, every node has a counter containing the number of leak roots that can reach it.
Finally, the algorithm calculates the LeakShare of each leak root (n.LS ) by adding up the
size of each reachable node divided by its counter, which splits the “credit” for the node
among all leak roots that can reach it (line 20).
4.3 Implementation
Applying BLeak’s algorithms to web applications poses a number of significant engi-
neering challenges:
Leak identification and ranking: BLeak uses heap snapshots to identify and rank leaks,
but many native methods (implemented in C++) do not expose their state to JavaScript
heap snapshots. These native methods can harbor memory leaks and reduce the apparent
severity of leaks that retain native state.
Leak diagnosis: BLeak’s diagnostic strategy assumes that it can collect stack traces when
relevant growth occurs, but the browser hides some state and state updates from JavaScript
reflection. Native methods bypass JavaScript reflection and mutate state. JavaScript re-
flection cannot introspect into function closures, necessitating program transformations to
expose this state. Transforming a web application is difficult because it can load code at any
time from remote servers over HTTP or encrypted HTTPS. In addition, JavaScript contains
dynamic features that are necessary but challenging to support with code transformations,
including eval and with statements.
BLeak consists of three main components that work together to overcome these chal-
lenges (see Figure 4.6): (1) a driver program orchestrates the leak debugging process
(§4.3.1); (2) a proxy transparently performs code rewriting on-the-fly on the target web
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Figure 4.6: BLeak implementation overview. BLeak consists of a driver program that
orchestrates the leak detection process (§4.3.1), a proxy that transparently rewrites the
target web application’s JavaScript during leak diagnosis (§4.3.2), and an agent script em-
bedded in the application that hooks into relevant web APIs and leak roots (§4.3.3). Given
a short developer-provided configuration script, BLeak automatically produces a leak re-
port. White rectangles are BLeak components, gray items are automatically rewritten by
the proxy during leak diagnosis, and black items are unmodified.
application and eval-ed strings (§4.3.2); and (3) an agent script embedded within the appli-
cation exposes hidden state for leak detection and growth events for leak diagnosis (§4.3.3).
4.3.1 BLeak Driver
The BLeak driver is responsible for orchestrating the leak debugging process. To initi-
ate leak debugging, the driver launches BLeak’s proxy and a standard version of the Google
Chrome browser with an empty cache, a fresh user profile, and a configuration that uses
the BLeak proxy. The driver connects to the browser via the standard Chrome DevTools
Protocol [47], navigates to the target web application, and uses the developer-provided
configuration file to drive the application in a loop. After each repeated visit to the first
visual state in the loop, the driver takes a heap snapshot via the remote debugging protocol,
and runs PropagateGrowth (Figure 4.3) to propagate growth information between heap
snapshots. Prior to taking a heap snapshot, the driver calls a method in the BLeak agent
embedded in the web application that prepares the DOM for snapshotting (§4.3.3.2).
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At the end of a configurable number of loop iterations (the default is 8), the driver shifts
into diagnostic mode. The driver runs FindLeakPaths to locate all of the paths to all
of the leak roots (Figure 4.4), configures the proxy to perform code rewriting for diagnosis
(§4.3.2), and reloads the page to pull in the transformed version of the web application.
The driver runs the application in a single loop iteration before triggering the BLeak
agent to insert diagnostic hooks that collect stack traces at all of the paths reported by
FindLeakPaths (§4.3.3.1). Then, the driver runs the application in a final loop before
retrieving the collected stack traces from the agent. Finally, the driver runs LeakShare
(Figure 4.5) to rank the leak roots and generates a memory leak report.
4.3.2 BLeak Proxy
The BLeak proxy uses mitmproxy [31] to transparently intercept all HTTP and HTTPS
traffic between the web application and the network. The proxy rewrites the web appli-
cation’s JavaScript during leak diagnosis to move closure variables into explicit scope ob-
jects, chains scope objects together to enable scope lookup at runtime, and exposes an
HTTP endpoint for transforming eval-ed code. The proxy also injects the BLeak agent
and developer-provided configuration file into the application, uses Babel [11] to trans-
late emerging JavaScript features into code that BLeak can understand, and supports the
JavaScript with statement. Due to space constraints I do not discuss these features further.
Exposing closure variables for diagnosis: During leak diagnosis, the BLeak proxy
rewrites the JavaScript on the webpage, including JavaScript inlined into HTML, to make it
possible for the BLeak agent to instrument closure variables. Since this process distorts the
application’s memory footprint, BLeak does not use this process during leak detection and
ranking. This code transformation moves local variables into JavaScript “scope” objects
(Imagen uses a similar procedure to implement JavaScript heap snapshots [74]). Scope
objects are ordinary JavaScript objects where property foo refers to the local variable foo;
the browser-provided window object functions as a global scope object, and works identically.
BLeak adds a scope property to all JavaScript Function objects that refer to that
function’s defining scope, and rewrites all variable reads and writes to refer to properties in
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the scope object. With this transformation, the BLeak agent can capture variable updates
in the transformed program in the same manner as object properties.
As an optimization, BLeak performs a conservative escape analysis to avoid transform-
ing variables that are not captured by any function closures. However, if the program calls
eval or uses the with statement, then BLeak assumes that all reachable variables escape.
The scope object transformation treats function arguments differently than local vari-
ables. A function’s arguments are reflected in an implicit array-like object called arguments,
and updates to an argument also update the corresponding element in arguments.2 To pre-
serve this behavior, BLeak rewrites updates to arguments so that it simultaneously updates
the property in the scope object and the original argument variable.
Runtime scope lookup: The JavaScript transformation knows statically which scope
objects contain which variables, but the BLeak agent needs this information at runtime
to instrument the correct scope object for a given variable. One solution would be to reify
scope information into runtime metadata objects that the agent can query, but this would
add further runtime and memory overhead. Instead, the proxy uses a simpler design that
uses JavaScript’s built-in prototype inheritance to naturally encode scope chains. Each
scope object inherits from its parent, and the outermost scope object inherits from the
browser-provided window object. To perform scope lookup, the BLeak agent uses JavaScript
reflection to find the first scope object in the chain that defines a property corresponding
to the variable.
eval support: eval evaluates a string as code within the context of the call site, posing two
key challenges: (1) the string may not be known statically, and (2) the string may refer to
outer variables that the code transformation moved into scope objects. The proxy overcomes
these challenges by cooperating with the BLeak agent. The proxy transforms all references
to eval into references to a BLeak agent-provided function that sends the program text
synchronously to the proxy for transformation via an HTTP POST. The proxy transforms
eval-ed code so that references to variables not explicitly defined in the new code refer
2This behavior does not occur in “strict mode”, but many prominent libraries do not opt into “strict
mode”.
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to a single scope object, and then returns the transformed code to the agent. The agent
creates the single scope object as an ECMAScript 2015 Proxy object [100] that interposes
on property reads and writes to relay them to the appropriate scope object using runtime
scope lookup (Proxy objects are available in modern versions of all major browsers). Finally,
the agent calls eval on the transformed code. Since this code transformation is independent
of calling context, the BLeak agent can cache and re-use transformed code strings.
4.3.3 BLeak Agent
The BLeak agent is a JavaScript file that BLeak automatically embeds in the web
application; it exposes globally-accessible functions that the BLeak driver can invoke via
the Chrome DevTools Protocol. The agent is responsible for installing diagnostic hooks
that collect stack traces for growth events. The agent also exposes hidden state in the
browser’s native methods so that PropagateGrowth (Figure 4.3) can find leaks within
or accessible through this state.
4.3.3.1 Diagnostic Hooks
To diagnose memory leaks as described in Section 4.2.2, the BLeak agent needs to
interpose on leak root growth, shrinkage, and assignment events. Although all leak roots
are JavaScript objects, some types of objects have native browser methods that implicitly
grow, shrink, or assign to properties on the object, necessitating interface-specific hooks:
Object hooks: BLeak uses Proxy objects to detect when objects gain and lose properties.
These Proxy objects wrap JavaScript objects and expose hooks for various object operations,
including when the application adds, deletes, reads, or writes properties on the object.
Proxy objects do not automatically take the place of the object they wrap in the heap,
so the BLeak agent must replace all references to the object with the proxy to completely
capture all growth/shrinkage events. If the agent fails to replace a reference, then it will not
capture any object updates that occur through that reference. BLeak can miss a reference
if it does not appear in the heap snapshot used for FindLeakPaths (Figure 4.4). This
could happen if the heap path to the reference is determined by some external factor, such
as the clock, a random number, or the amount of time spent on the page. This behavior
51
appears to be rare; in our evaluation, BLeak reports all but one of the relevant stack traces
for all of the true leaks it finds.
Proxy objects are semantically equivalent to the original object except that programs can
observe that Proxy(O) 6= O. Since BLeak cannot guarantee that it replaces all references
to O with Proxy(O), a program could run incorrectly if it directly compared these two
objects. To preserve correctness, the BLeak proxy also transforms the binary operations
==, ===, !=, !== into calls to an agent function that treats Proxy(O) as equal to O. The
BLeak agent also reimplements the functions Array.indexOf and Array.lastIndexOf, which
report the index of a particular item in an array, so that calls with Proxy objects function
appropriately.
Array hooks: JavaScript arrays contain a number of built-in functions that mutate the
array without invoking Proxy hooks. The agent wraps Array’s push, pop, unshift, shift,
and splice functions to appropriately capture growth / shrinkage / assignment events.
DOM node hooks: Applications can add and remove nodes from the DOM tree via
browser-provided interfaces; these operations are not captured via Proxy objects. In order
to capture relevant events on DOM nodes, the agent must wrap a number of functions
and special properties. On Node objects, it wraps textContent, appendChild, insertBefore,
normalize, removeChild, and replaceChild. On Element objects, it wraps innerHTML, outer-
HTML, insertAdjacentElement, insertAdjacentHTML, insertAdjacentText, and remove.
Leak root assignment hooks: Given a path P = (e1, . . . , en) to a leak root, the agent
instruments all edges e ∈ P to capture when the program overwrites any objects or variables
in the path from the GC root to the leak root. For example, given the path window.foo.bar,
the program can overwrite bar by assigning a new value to foo or bar. When a leak root
gets overwritten with a new value, the agent also wraps that value in a Proxy object.
To interpose on these edges, the agent uses JavaScript reflection to replace object prop-
erties with getters and setters that interpose on its modification. Since the BLeak proxy
rewrites closure variables into properties on scope objects (§4.3.2), this approach works for
all edges in the heap graph.
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Figure 4.7: Impact of fixing memory leaks found with BLeak. Graphs display live heap
size over round trips; error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Fixing the reported
leaks eliminates an average of 93% of all heap growth.
4.3.3.2 Exposing Hidden State
Some of the browser’s native methods hide state from heap snapshots, preventing BLeak
from accurately identifying and ranking memory leaks involving this state. To overcome this
limitation, the agent builds a mirror of hidden state using JavaScript objects. Using these
mirrors, BLeak can locate and diagnose memory leaks that are in or accessible through
DOM nodes, event listeners, and partially applied functions.
DOM nodes: The agent builds a mirror of the DOM tree as JavaScript objects before the
BLeak driver takes a heap snapshot, and installs it at the global variable $$$DOM$$$. Each
node in the tree contains the array childNodes that contains a JavaScript array of (mirror)
nodes, and a property root that points to the original native DOM node.
Event listeners: The agent overwrites addEventListener and removeEventListener to ea-
gerly maintain an object containing all of the installed listeners. Because this object is
maintained eagerly, ordinary object and array hooks capture event listener list growth.
Function.bind: The bind function provides native support for partial application, and im-
plicitly retains the arguments passed to it. The agent overwrites this function with a pure
JavaScript version that retains the arguments as ordinary JavaScript closure variables.
4.4 Evaluation
I evaluate BLeak by running it on production web applications. The evaluation ad-
dresses the following questions:
• Precision: How precise is BLeak’s memory leak detection? (§4.4.2)
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• Accuracy of diagnoses: Does BLeak accurately locate the code responsible for mem-
ory leaks? (§4.4.2)
• Overhead: Does BLeak impose acceptable overhead? (§4.4.2)
• Impact of discovered leaks: How impactful are the memory leaks that BLeak finds?
(§4.4.3)
• Utility of ranking: Is LeakShare an effective metric for ranking the severity of memory
leaks? (§4.4.4)
• Staleness vs. growth: How does BLeak compare to a staleness-based leak detector?
(§4.4.5)
The evaluation finds 59 distinct memory leaks across five web applications, all of which
were unknown to application developers. Of these, 27 corresponded to known-but-unfixed
memory leaks in JavaScript library dependencies, of which only 6 were independently diag-
nosed and had pending fixes. I reported all 32 new memory leaks to the relevant developers
along with my fixes; 16 are now fixed, and 4 have fixes in code review. I found new leaks in
popular applications and libraries including Airbnb, Angular JS (1.x), Google Maps SDK,
Google Tag Manager, and Google Analytics. Appendix A lists each of these memory leaks,
the application or library responsible, and links to bug reports with fixes.
I run BLeak on each web application for 8 round trips through specific visual states
to produce a BLeak leak report, as in Figure 4.2. I describe these loops using only 17–73
LOC; Appendix B contains the code for each loop. This process takes less than 15 minutes
per application on the evaluation machine, a MacBook Pro with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5
and 16GB of RAM. For each application, I analyze the reported leaks, write a fix for each
true leak, measure the impact of fixing the leaks, and compare LeakShare with alternative
ranking metrics.
4.4.1 Applications
Because there is no existing corpus of benchmarks for web application memory leak
detection, I created one. The corpus consists of five popular web applications that both
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Loop Leak False Distinct Stale Growth
Program LOC Roots Pos. Leaks Leaks Prec. Reduction
Airbnb 17 32 2 32 4 94% 1.04 MB (81.0%)
Piwik 32 17 0 11 4 100% 8.14 MB (99.3%)
Loomio 73 10 1 9 4 90% 2.83 MB (98.3%)
Mailpile 37 4 0 3 1 100% 0.80 MB (91.8%)
Firefox Debugger 17 4 0 4 0 100% 0.47 MB (98.2%)
Total / mean: 35 67 3 59 13 96.8% 2.66 MB (93.7%)
Table 4.1: BLeak precision and accuracy results. On average, BLeak finds these leaks
with over 95% precision, and fixing them eliminates over 90% of all heap growth. 77% of
these leaks would not be found with a staleness metric (§4.4.5).
comprise large code bases and whose overall memory usage appeared to be growing over
time. I primarily focus on open source web applications because it is easier to develop
fixes for the original source code; this represents the normal use case for developers. I also
include a single closed-source website, Airbnb, to demonstrate BLeak’s ability to diagnose
websites in production. I present each web application, highlight a selection of the libraries
they use, and describe the loop of visual states we use in the evaluation:
Airbnb [5]: A website offering short-term rentals and other services, Airbnb uses React,
Google Maps SDK, Google Analytics, the Criteo OneTag Loader, and Google Tag Manager.
BLeak loops between the pages /s/all, which lists all services offered on Airbnb, and
/s/homes, which lists only homes and rooms for rent.
Piwik 3.0.2 [109]: A widely-used open-source analytics platform; I run BLeak on its
in-browser dashboard that displays analytics results. The dashboard primarily uses jQuery
and AngularJS. BLeak repeatedly visits the main dashboard page, which displays a grid
of widgets.
Loomio 1.8.66 [75]: An open-source collaborative platform for group decision-making.
Loomio uses AngularJS, LokiJS, and Google Tag Manager. BLeak runs Loomio in a loop
between a group page, which lists all of the threads in that group, and the first thread listed
on that page.
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Mailpile v1.0.0 [77]: An open-source mail client. Mailpile uses jQuery. BLeak runs
Mailpile’s demo [76] in a loop that visits the inbox and the first four emails in the inbox
(revisiting the inbox in-between emails).
Firefox Debugger (commit 91f5c63) [38]: An open-source JavaScript debugger written
in React that runs in any web browser. I run the debugger while it is attached to a Firefox
instance running Mozilla’s SensorWeb [97]. BLeak runs the debugger in a loop that opens
and closes SensorWeb’s main.js in the debugger’s text editor.
4.4.2 Precision, Accuracy, and Overhead
To determine BLeak’s leak detection precision and the accuracy of its diagnoses, I
manually check each BLeak-reported leak in the final report to confirm (1) that it is
growing without bound and (2) that the stack traces correctly report the code responsible
for the growth. To determine BLeak’s overhead, I log the runtime of the following specific
operations during automatic leak debugging: BLeak’s three core algorithms from §4.2
(Algs), proxy transformations from §4.3.2 (Proxy), and receiving and parsing heap snapshots
from Google Chrome (Snapshot). I was unable to gather overhead information for Airbnb,
the only closed-source application, because the company fixed the leaks I reported prior
to this experiment. Table 4.1 summarizes precision and accuracy results, and Table 4.2
summarizes overhead results.
BLeak has an average precision of 96.8%, and a median precision of 100%
on the evaluation applications. There are only three false positives. All point to an object
that continuously grows until some threshold or timeout occurs; developers using BLeak
can avoid these false positives by increasing the number of round trips. Two of the three
false positives are actually the same object located in the Google Tag Manager JavaScript
library.
With one exception, BLeak accurately identifies the code responsible for all
of the true leaks. BLeak reports stack traces that directly identifies the code responsible
for each leak. In cases where multiple independent source locations grow the same leak
root, BLeak reports all relevant source locations. For one specific memory leak, BLeak
fails to record a stack trace. Guided by BLeak’s leak reports, I was able to fix
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Runtime
Program Total Algs Proxy Snapshot
Piwik 224 s 7.1% 4.7% 50.3%
Loomio 149 s 3.7% 6.2% 37.9%
Mailpile 388 s 0.4% 1.0% 4.0%
Firefox Debugger 214 s 2.3% 37.9% 33.6%
Mean: 243.8 s 3.4% 12.5% 31.4%
Table 4.2: BLeak overhead results. BLeak takes less than 7 minutes to locate, rank, and
diagnose memory leaks in each open-source evaluation application.
every memory leak. Fixing each memory leak took approximately 15 minutes. Most
fixes involve adding simple cleanup hooks to remove unneeded references or logic to avoid
duplicating state every round trip.
BLeak locates, ranks, and diagnoses memory leaks in less than 7 minutes on
the open-source evaluation applications. BLeak’s core algorithms (PropagateGrowth,
FindLeakPaths, CalculateLeakShare) contribute less than 8% to that runtime. The
primary contribution to overhead on all benchmarks, with one exception, is receiving and
parsing Chrome’s JSON-based heap snapshots. The Firefox Debugger spends more time in
the proxy because it uses new JavaScript features that BLeak supports by invoking the
Babel compiler, which dominates proxy runtime for that application [11].
4.4.3 Leak Impact
To determine the impact of the memory leaks that BLeak reports, I measure each
application’s live heap size over 10 loop iterations with and without my fixes. I use BLeak’s
HTTP/HTTPS proxy to directly inject memory leak fixes into the application, which lets
us test fixes on closed-source websites like Airbnb. I run each application except Airbnb 5
times in each configuration (I run Airbnb only once per configuration for reasons discussed
in §4.4.4).
To calculate the leaks’ combined impact on overall heap growth, I calculate the average
live heap growth between loop iterations with and without the fixes in place, and take the
difference (Growth Reduction). For this metric, I ignore the first five loop iterations because
these are noisy due to application startup. Figure 4.7 and Table 4.1 present the results.
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Growth Reduction for Top Leaks Fixed
Program Metric 25% 50% 75%
Airbnb
LeakShare 0K 111K 462K
Retained Size 0K 0K 105K
Trans. Closure Size 0K 196K 393K
Loomio
LeakShare 0K 1083K 2878K
Retained Size 64K 186K 2898K
Trans. Closure Size 59K 67K 2398K
Mailpile
LeakShare 613K 817K 820K
Retained Size 613K 817K 820K
Trans. Closure Size 0K 0K 201K
Piwik
LeakShare 8003K 8104K 8306K
Retained Size 2073K 7969K 8235K
Trans. Closure Size 103K 110K 374K
Table 4.3: Performance of memory leak ranking metrics. The table displays growth reduc-
tion by metric after fixing quartiles of top ranked leaks. Bold indicates greatest reduction
(±1%). I omit Firefox because it has only four leaks which must all be fixed (see §2.2).
LeakShare generally outperforms or matches other metrics.
On average, fixing the memory leaks that BLeak reports eliminates over 93%
of all heap growth on the evaluation applications (median: 98.2%). These results suggest
that BLeak does not miss any significantly impactful leaks.
4.4.4 LeakShare Effectiveness
I compare LeakShare against two alternative ranking metrics: retained size and transi-
tive closure size. Retained size corresponds to the amount of memory the garbage collector
would reclaim if the leak root were removed from the heap graph, and is the metric that
standard heap snapshot viewers display to the developer [64,85,96,105]. The transitive clo-
sure size of a leak root is the size of all objects reachable from the leak root; Xu et al. use
this metric along with staleness to rank Java container memory leaks [150]. Since JavaScript
heaps are highly connected and frequently contain references to the global scope, I expect
this metric to report similar values for most leaks.
I measure the effectiveness of each ranking metric by calculating the growth reduction
(as in §4.4.3) over the application with no fixes after fixing each memory leak in ranked
order. I then calculate the quartiles of this data, indicating how much heap growth is
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eliminated after fixing the top 25%, 50%, and 75% of memory leaks reported ranked by a
given metric. I sought to write patches for each evaluation application that fix a single leak
root at a time, but this is not feasible in all cases. Specifically, one Airbnb patch fixes two
leak roots; one Mailpile patch (a jQuery bug) fixes two leak roots; and one Piwik patch,
which targeted a loop, fixes nine leak roots. In these cases, I apply the patch during a
ranking for the first relevant leak root reported.
I run each application except Airbnb for ten loop iterations over five runs for each unique
combination of metric and number of top-ranked leak roots to fix. I avoid running duplicate
configurations when multiple metrics report the same ranking. Airbnb is challenging to
evaluate because it has 30 leak roots, randomly performs A/B tests between runs, and
periodically updates its minified codebase in ways that break my memory leak fixes. As a
result, I was only able to gather one run of data for Airbnb for each unique configuration.
Table 4.3 displays the results.
In most cases, LeakShare outperforms or ties the other metrics. LeakShare
initially is outperformed by other metrics on Airbnb and Loomio because it prioritizes leak
roots that share significant state with other leak roots. Retained size always prioritizes leak
roots that uniquely own the most state, which provide the most growth reduction in the
short term. LeakShare eventually surpasses the other metrics on these two applications as
it fixes the final leak roots holding on to shared state.
4.4.5 Leak Staleness
I manually analyzed the leaks BLeak finds to determine whether they would also be
found using a staleness-based technique. I assume that, to avoid falsely reporting most
event listeners as stale, a staleness-based technique would exercise each event listener on
the page that could be triggered via normal user interaction. In this case, no memory
leaks stemming from event listener lists would be found by a staleness-based tool. Leaks in
internal application arrays and objects that emulate event listener lists for user-triggered
events would also not be found. Finally, I assume that active DOM elements in the DOM
tree would not be marked stale, since they are clearly in use by the webpage. Memory leaks
stemming from node lists in the DOM would also not be found by a staleness-based tech-
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nique. Of the memory leaks BLeak finds, at least 77% would not be found with
a staleness-based approach. Table 4.1 presents results per application (see Appendix A
for individual leaks).
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented BLeak, the first effective system for debugging client-side mem-
ory leaks in web applications. I show that BLeak has high precision and finds numerous
previously-unknown memory leaks in production web applications and libraries. BLeak is
open source [145], and is available for download at http://bleak-detector.org/.
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CHAPTER 5
BCAUSE: CAUSAL PROGRAM UNDERSTANDING FOR WEB
APPLICATIONS
Web applications are challenging to understand because they are pervasively asyn-
chronous. After a web application initializes, JavaScript code only executes in response
to browser events, which break application execution across thousands of short-duration
periods. It is challenging to track a web application’s control flow through these events, as
each event’s root causes are not always apparent.
This chapter introduces BCause, a framework for understanding asynchronous control
flow in web applications. During a browsing session, BCause records a trace of JavaScript
events and implicit control flow edges between JavaScript events. Once collected, BCause
can use the trace to reason about web application behavior and construct a causal graph of
the events in the execution. The causal graph is a weakly connected directed graph; every
node in the graph, which correspond to JavaScript events, can be reached from the root
node, which corresponds to the root HTML document of the web application, via edges
that correspond to asynchronous control flow edges. Thus, BCause can reason about the
root causes of every event in the execution by tracing a path back to the root node.
I demonstrate the accuracy and utility of BCause’s graphs by building AdBlame,
which uses the causal graph to predict the bandwidth consumption of a web application with
ad blocking enabled to within 2.2% of the ground truth. AdBlame uses BCause’s tracing
infrastructure to log program actions that may initiate network requests, and analyzes the
resulting causal graph to filter out requests that depend on blocked scripts and HTML
documents. On a corpus of production websites, I show that AdBlame is significantly
more accurate at predicting bandwidth savings than directly applying ad blocker filter rules
to a network traffic log.
61
Figure 5.1: Snippet from the HTML5 standard that describes events on Image objects [146].
Setting the src property on an Image object causes the browser to download the image; if
the download succeeds, then the browser triggers load and loadend events. All JavaScript
events are specified informally in standards documents like this one.
5.1 Challenges
There are two primary challenges to building a causal graph of a web application’s
events: 1) determining the program actions that precede specific events, and 2) collecting
sufficient information from a program’s execution to construct the graph.
Specifying happens-before relations: In order to build a causal graph of a web ap-
plication’s events, it is necessary to understand what program actions may initiate (and
happen-before) specific JavaScript events. If event E1 performs program action A, and A
happens-before event E2, then there should be a link in the causal graph between E1 and
E2. For example, setting the src property on an image object initiates a network request to
fetch the image, which causes a load event to occur. In addition, before the web application
can observe the load event, it must register a JavaScript function to listen for the event
via addEventListener or the onload property. Thus, setting src and registering an event
listener on an image happen-before load.
Unfortunately, these happens-before relations are only informally specified in plain-
English standards documents. Figure 5.1 displays a snippet from the HTML5 standard
that describes when the load event occurs on Image objects. Previous systems that require
knowledge of event causality, including JavaScript race detectors [106, 113] and tools for
understanding program behavior [6,72,73], manually encode every happens-before relation
needed to support their use cases. As discussed further in Section 8.3, these systems miss
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many happens-before relations. For example, these systems do not recognize that setting
the src property on an Image object causes the load event to occur, but do recognize that
the program must register an event listener for load.
Collecting execution traces: Constructing a causal graph also requires collecting suffi-
cient information about a program’s execution. Many previous systems that reason about
event causality modify the web browser itself to collect this information [72,106,113], which
reduces the overhead of logging but limits portability across browsers and browser versions.
Other systems require no browser modifications, and instead use JavaScript reflection to
interpose on select browser interfaces [6,73]. All of these systems contain manually written
logging logic for each of the happens-before relations that they support, which is a fragile
and error-prone approach.
5.2 BCause Overview
This section provides an overview of how BCause supports identifying happens-before
relations between program actions and events, collects an execution trace, and uses the
trace to produce a causal graph.
Specifying happens-before relations: While previous systems rely on fragile hand writ-
ten happens-before logic, BCause takes a novel approach that automates the process of
inferring happens-before rules and generating logging code. BCause automatically classifies
browser interfaces into five distinct categories (§5.3) using WebIDL (§5.4.3) [81]. BCause
uses this classification to automatically infer most happens-before relations and to generate
JavaScript code that runs alongside the web application and logs causal information for each
type of interface. Since modern web browsers use WebIDL to generate bindings between
their native C++ codebases and JavaScript, BCause can rely upon browser implementa-
tions of web standards matching the interface specification. Using browser-supplied WebIDL
files, BCause will automatically support new web interfaces as browsers implement them.
When a happens-before relation is not evident from static type information, such as the
relation between the src property of an Image and the load event, I manually annotate
the relevant WebIDL file with the relation. Annotations are a well-supported feature of
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WebIDL, and browsers use them to inform code generation. BCause uses these happens-
before annotations to automatically generate the required logging logic.
Collecting a trace: To collect a trace, the developer opens a web browser configured to
use BCause, and navigates to their web application. While the developer interacts with
the web application, BCause logs important web application actions to disk, including:
• The start and end of every JavaScript event.
• The start and end of HTML and JavaScript initialization.
• Program actions that may initiate (and happen before) JavaScript events, HTML ini-
tialization, and JavaScript initialization. These program actions include event listener
registrations and HTML/JavaScript code that cause events to occur. Each program
action includes a stack trace that points to the JavaScript statements responsible for
the action.
Since JavaScript execution is single-threaded (i.e., triggered events wait for prior events
to finish executing), these trace entries are totally ordered by the sequence in which they
occur. BCause ends the trace when the developer closes the browser or navigates to a
different URL.
Constructing a causal graph: Given a trace file, BCause can construct a causal graph
of a web application’s events. Each node in the graph represents a JavaScript event or the
initialization of an HTML document. An edge from node A to node B indicates a program
action that happened during node A that caused node B to later occur, and contains a
stack trace pointing to the JavaScript code that caused the action to occur.
Using this graph, developers and automated tools can determine why a program is
performing certain actions, even when control flow edges are obscured by DOM interactions.
Figure 5.2 displays a subgraph of eBay’s behavior collected with BCause. The graph
displays the chain of activities that cause eBay to create an IFrame containing HTML from
the advertising service stags.bluekai.com:
1. The HTML of https://www.ebay.com/ contains an inline script on line 288. Inline
scripts execute in order as the HTML document loads.
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Figure 5.2: A subgraph of eBay.com’s causal graph collected with BCause. The graph
displays the chain of program actions that causes eBay to create an IFrame that points to
stags.bluekai.com, an advertising service.
2. The inline script adds an event listener on the HTML document’s load event, which
executes once the HTML document and its resources finish loading.
3. The event listener inserts a script element into the DOM via appendChild, and points
it to https://srv.main.ebayrtm.com/rtm by writing the src attribute. This action
causes the browser to fetch and execute the JavaScript code at that URL.
4. When rtm initializes, it injects a string containing HTML into the DOM via in-
sertAdjacentHTML, which contains an IFrame. The code then points the IFrame to
https://stags.bluekai.com/site/20093 by writing the src attribute. The browser
then fetches and executes the HTML at that URL.
Since each edge contains a full stack trace, BCause points developers directly to the lines
of code responsible for each event.
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5.3 Trace Entries
In order to build a causal graph, BCause collects a trace of web application actions
at runtime. The trace comprises start and end entries for JavaScript events and HTML
initializations, along with program actions that may cause future events to occur. BCause
needs to be able to associate each JavaScript event, HTML initialization, and JavaScript
initialization with the one or more program actions that caused it. Accordingly, trace entries
refer to a specific JavaScript event or initialization event using unique identifiers that are
tied to specific objects or browser API invocations. This section describes how BCause
trace entries refer to each type of major program event. Later, Section 5.4.3 describes how
BCause uses WebIDL to automatically recognize browser interfaces that correspond to
each major program event and generate appropriate logging logic.
5.3.1 DOM Events
Certain DOM objects are event targets that emit named DOM events. For example,
DOM nodes emit user interaction events including “click”, “keydown”, and “scroll”. A web
application can register a JavaScript function as an event listener for one or more of these
events via addEventListener or event handler properties that begin with on. The browser
will invoke the event listener when the listened-for events occur.
BCause associates each event target object with a unique ID, and each event listener
registration with a unique ID. Subtly, a JavaScript function registered as an event listener
multiple times will have a unique ID for each registration. At the beginning and end of
an event listener’s execution, BCause creates a trace entry that contains both IDs along
with the name of the event. BCause also creates a trace entry with the same identifying
information when event listeners are registered and unregistered, which appear as incoming
edges to event listener execution nodes in the causal graph.
When the program performs an action that may cause a DOM event on an event target,
BCause creates a log entry that contains the tuple of the event target ID and event name.
These log entries do not refer to specific event listeners, as each program action precedes
the execution of any event listener for a specific event on a specific object. For example,
if the web application sets the src property of an HTML script element, the browser will
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Object Type Properties Action Causes
Element scroll{, To, By} Call scroll
Element scroll{Top, Left} Set scroll
FileReader readAs{ArrayBuffer,
BinaryString, Text,
DataURL}
Call error, load{, start, end},
progress
FileReader abort Call abort
FileWriter write, truncate Call error, progress, write{, end,
start}
FileWriter abort Call abort
HTMLElement focus Call selectionchange (on
this.ownerDocument)
HTMLIFrameElement src, srcdoc Set error, load, HTML init.
HTMLIFrameElement N/A Add to DOM HTML init.
HTMLImageElement src Set error, load, loadend
HTMLLinkElement href Set error, load
HTMLMediaElement src Set error, load{, start, end}
HTMLScriptElement src Set error, load, JavaScript init.
HTMLScriptElement text Set JavaScript init.
HTMLScriptElement N/A Add to DOM JavaScript init.
WebSocket constructor Construct close, error, message, open
WebSocket close Call close
Window scroll{ , To, By} Call scroll (on this.document)
XMLHttpRequest send Call error, load{, end, start},
progress, timeout, upload
(on this and this.upload);
readystatechange (on this)
Table 5.1: Hand-annotated happens-before relations for standard web APIs. All additional
relations are automatically derived from browser-supplied WebIDL files. Causes contains
the set of events that the action may cause. Some properties on element object types,
such as src, are reflected as HTML attributes; BCause tracks both HTML attribute and
JavaScript property changes. For space reasons, the table excludes annotations on nine
interfaces related to the IndexedDB object database.
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(a) Causal graph of a program that calls the
callback API requestAnimationFrame.
(b) Causal graph of a program that calls the
Promise API Navigator.getBattery.
Figure 5.3: Causal graphs of programs that invoke different types of asynchronous operation
APIs. BCause accurately captures causal graphs for both callback-based and Promise-
based asynchronous operations.
either emit a load event or an error event on the script element depending on if it could
load the script. If event listeners for either event executes after this occurs, then BCause
knows to draw a link in the causal graph between the node that performed the action and
nodes corresponding to each event listener execution. I manually identified these special
program actions, as the connection between events and specific program actions are only
described informally in web standards documents. Table 5.1 contains a listing of manually
identified program actions that precede or cause events.
5.3.2 Asynchronous Operations
Some browser APIs correspond to asynchronous operations that the browser performs
on behalf of the web application. The web application provides the API with JavaScript
functions, which the browser invokes once the operation completes or fails. The browser
contains two different types of asynchronous operation APIs: callback-based and Promise-
based.
Callbacks: Callback APIs accept one or more JavaScript functions as arguments, which are
later invoked zero or more times as an operation proceeds. Timers created via setTimeout
and setInterval fall under this category, as does requestAnimationFrame, which invokes
a callback before the next time the GUI is repainted.
BCause associates each invocation of a callback API with a unique invocation ID.
When the web application invokes a callback API, BCause logs a trace entry containing
68
this invocation ID. When the browser later invokes a function passed to the callback API,
BCause logs start and end trace entries that refer to the original invocation of the callback
API by its invocation ID. With this information, BCause constructs a link in the causal
graph between the graph node that invoked the callback API and nodes corresponding to
invocations of functions passed to the API. Figure 5.3a displays an example causal graph
for a program that calls requestAnimationFrame.
Promises: Emerging asynchronous browser APIs return a Promise object. A Promise
object encapsulates the state and result of an asynchronous operation. Promises are a
recent addition to the browser, and were only standardized in ECMAScript 2015. Web
applications can use methods on the Promise object to register JavaScript functions that
run when the Promise resolves successfully or is rejected with an error message. Promises
can also be chained together so that values and errors flow through multiple Promise objects,
which obscures the causal links between program actions and Promise events.
To support Promises without directly tracking their complicated internal control flow,
BCause wraps each browser-provided Promise in a pure JavaScript implementation of a
Promise. BCause traces the JavaScript Promise implementation alongside the application,
which ensures that BCause’s causal graphs properly track causal links through Promise
objects without any special Promise support. When the web application invokes an API
that returns a Promise, BCause logs a trace entry with a unique ID corresponding to the
API invocation. When the browser resolves or rejects the Promise, BCause logs a trace
entry with the same ID, which forms an edge in the causal graph between the node that
invoked the API and the JavaScript functions that the resolved or rejected Promise invokes.
Figure 5.3b displays an example causal graph for a program that calls the Promise-based
API Navigator.getBattery.
5.3.3 Cross-document Messages
Using the postMessage interface on Window and MessagePort objects, JavaScript code
can send messages and certain types of objects to other documents within the web applica-
tion. BCause modifies each message to contain a unique ID, which it logs to track the event
that created the message. When the web application processes a message event, BCause
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reads the ID from the message and includes it in a trace entry that marks the start and
end of a message event. It then removes the ID from the message before sending it on to
the application.
5.3.4 JavaScript Initialization
A web application can include JavaScript code via script HTML elements in the DOM.
This code executes asynchronously when its contents load. JavaScript initialization occurs
when a script element’s JavaScript code executes for the first time. Before a script element
can initialize JavaScript code, it must be inserted into the DOM tree, and it must either
contain inline JavaScript source code or its src property must refer to a URL containing
JavaScript.
BCause associates each script element with a unique ID, and logs a trace entry con-
taining the ID when any precondition to script initialization occurs (see Table 5.1). At the
start and end of JavaScript initialization, BCause logs a trace entry referring to the same
ID, along with a second trace entry specifying that the current initialization precedes a
load DOM event on the script element. Figure 5.2 shows a causal graph of eBay.com that
contains JavaScript initialization for https://srv.main.ebayrtm.com/rtm.
5.3.5 HTML Initialization
A web application’s execution begins with the browser loading and initializing a root
HTML document specified in the browser’s address bar. It is necessary to track HTML
initialization as it directly influences JavaScript execution. HTML can contain inline
JavaScript event listeners, HTML attributes that initiate JavaScript events (correspond-
ing to some properties in Table 5.1), script elements that initialize JavaScript code, and
iframe elements that embed other HTML documents.
BCause log entries identify the root HTML document by a unique ID associated with
the root document object, and subdocuments by a unique ID associated with each IFrame
object. BCause creates a log entry that refers to this ID every time the web application
creates an IFrame object or changes its source document, which forms an incoming edge to
the document’s HTML initialization node in the causal graph. When an HTML document
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initializes, BCause emits trace entries for any HTML content that may initiate subsequent
events bookended by trace entries indicating the start and end of trace entries associated
with this specific HTML document’s initialization.
JavaScript code can inject additional HTML snippets into the webpage as a string via
interfaces like innerHTML and document.write. BCause does not emit start and end events
for snippets, but does emit log entries for any injected HTML content that may initiate
JavaScript events. In the causal graph, these log entries appear as outgoing edges from the
node that injected the HTML.
5.4 Implementation
As shown in Figure 5.4, BCause comprises four components: 1) the BCause proxy
injects the agent and initialization hooks into JavaScript and HTML files, 2) the BCause
server collects traces, 3) the BCause hook generator automatically generates JavaScript
code that intercepts web application interactions with the browser, and 4) the BCause
agent runs alongside the web application and sends trace events to the server. During
trace generation, the developer uses an unmodified Google Chrome web browser that is
configured to use the BCause proxy. To facilitate JavaScript hooks into privileged browser
APIs, BCause disables several browser security features with command line arguments,
including the same origin policy and origin isolation within separate processes. BCause
could operate around these security restrictions with further browser integration. BCause
also disables service workers, which can perform application-specific caching services by
interposing on network requests. BCause could be extended to support service workers by
tracking happens-before relations through requests processed by the worker.
5.4.1 BCause Proxy
The BCause proxy uses mitmproxy [31] to transparently intercept all HTTP and
HTTPS traffic between the web application and the network. The proxy rewrites HTML
and JavaScript documents to inject the BCause agent into the application, and to call
into the agent to create trace entries that log the start and end of HTML and JavaScript
initialization.
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Figure 5.4: BCause implementation overview. BCause consists of a proxy that rewrites
HTML and JavaScript (§5.4.1), a server that stores trace files (§5.4.2), a hook generator
that automatically generates shims that intercept web application interactions with browser
APIs (§5.4.3), and an agent that monitors the DOM for changes and sends trace events to
the server (§5.4.4). These components work together to trace a web application’s execution
in an unmodified Chrome browser.
5.4.2 BCause Server
The BCause server accepts WebSocket connections from the BCause agent. Each
WebSocket connection corresponds to a single trace; the server pipes all messages from the
BCause agent into a gzipped trace file on disk.
5.4.3 BCause Hook Generator
Web standards documents use WebIDL, or Web Interface Description Language, to
define new interfaces between JavaScript and the browser. Many modern web browsers use
WebIDL to generate bindings between their native C++ codebases and JavaScript; this
process ensures that their implementations of web APIs hew closely to the standard.
I annotate WebIDL files from Chromium’s source code with the happens-before relations
listed in Table 5.1. The BCause hook generator parses these annotated WebIDL files
using the webidl2 library [147], and generates a JavaScript file that installs hooks into the
browser environment. Each hook replaces a browser-provided method or object property
with a version that calls into the BCause agent to produce the trace entries described in
Section 5.3.
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The hook generator automatically infers the remaining hooks using information already
present in Chromium’s WebIDL files:
Asynchronous operations and DOM events: Since WebIDL is statically typed, the
hook generator automatically finds and generates hooks for asynchronous operations and
event listener properties (e.g., onclick on HTMLElement objects). Callback-based asyn-
chronous operations accept a function as an argument, promise-based asynchronous opera-
tions return a Promise object, and event listener properties are of type EventHandler.
Reflected HTML attributes: Some JavaScript properties from Table 5.1 are actively
reflected as HTML attributes; the web application can change the property’s value via
JavaScript and HTML. For example, a web application can set the src property on an
HTMLScriptElement in the following ways: 1) as a JavaScript property (script.src
= newSrc), 2) as an HTML attribute (script.setAttribute("src", newSrc)), and 3)
within an HTML document (<script src="newSrc"></script>). BCause must support
all three variants in order to accurately track event causality.
Chromium’s WebIDL files annotate JavaScript properties that reflect an HTML at-
tribute with the Reflect WebIDL attribute. The BCause hook generator uses this infor-
mation to determine which HTML attributes to monitor using the BCause agent.
Cross-document messages: Web applications can send messages across documents via
the postMessage function on Window and MessagePort objects. Chromium’s WebIDL files
contain a PostMessage annotation on these functions, which guides BCause to this type
of function.
5.4.4 BCause Agent
The BCause agent runs alongside the web application and has four primary duties:
1) sending trace entries to the BCause server, 2) exposing hooks that monitor for DOM
changes, 3) hiding BCause’s modifications to the web application’s HTML and JavaScript
code from JavaScript reflection APIs, and 4) rewriting dynamically injected HTML and
JavaScript. Since every HTML document maintains a separate copy of the browser’s APIs,
the root document and every subdocument within an iframe contain a copy of the agent.
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Excluding library dependencies and autogenerated hooks, the source code to the BCause
agent is approximately 1.6 KLOC.
Sending trace entries: The BCause agent contains functions that send different types
of trace entries to the BCause server. The hooks generated by the hook generator call into
these functions to log trace entries. These functions assign or look up the unique IDs for
the trace entries described in Section 5.3 and send the entry to the BCause server via a
WebSocket connection. All of the BCause agents on the webpage share a single WebSocket
connection; BCause agents contained within IFrames send their trace entries to the root
agent for forwarding to the server. Thus, trace entries are stored in the order in which they
occurred at runtime.
DOM hooks: The BCause agent instruments the DOM APIs responsible for manipulating
HTML elements, and exposes a set of hooks for monitoring for changed attributes and
inserted HTML elements. The BCause hook generator uses these DOM hooks to log trace
entries for attribute changes and element insertions that may initiate JavaScript events or
register JavaScript event handlers.
Hiding code modifications: Web applications sometimes make assumptions about the
content of the HTML and JavaScript on the webpage. BCause’s HTML and JavaScript
modifications may invalidate some of these assumptions, causing application errors. For
example, AngularJS [46] applications encode HTML templates directly into the HTML of
the document, and dynamically fill in each template with information at runtime. Some
applications also inject script elements containing objects in JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) format that the application later reads and parses from the DOM.
The BCause agent instruments core DOM APIs to hide any HTML and JavaScript
modifications that it or the proxy makes. When the application queries the DOM for a list
of HTML elements, BCause returns a modified list that does not contain any BCause-
injected elements. When the application serializes HTML via APIs like innerHTML, BCause
parses the HTML, removes BCause modifications, and serializes the result as a string. If
the application reads the code contained within a script element, the BCause agent re-
moves any injected calls to the agent. The BCause agent also removes changes to HTML
and JavaScript documents when the web application manually downloads them via Xml-
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HttpRequest or fetch, as the proxy blindly rewrites all HTML and JavaScript documents.
As a result, web applications executing under BCause can continue to make assumptions
about the content of their HTML and JavaScript code.
Rewriting dynamically injected content: Although the BCause proxy rewrites Java-
Script and HTML files requested from the network, it is unable to rewrite dynamically
generated JavaScript and HTML content. Web applications can create and inject new
script and iframe elements with JavaScript or HTML code specified as a string or encoded
within a data: URL, causing new initialization events that BCause needs to track.
The BCause agent performs the same rewriting actions as the BCause proxy on dy-
namically generated HTML and JavaScript. The agent uses the same rewriting code as the
proxy, since the proxy is also written in JavaScript.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, I evaluate BCause in two dimensions:
• Accuracy: As a case study to measure BCause’s accuracy, I build a tool called
AdBlame that uses BCause’s causal graphs to predict the impact of ad blocking on
a web application’s bandwidth consumption.
• Overhead: I measure BCause’s runtime overhead on Speedometer 2.0 [21], a browser
benchmark suite comprised of GUI-driven web applications.
5.5.1 Accuracy
There is no established benchmark suite for web application event causality, and, since
happens-before relations are only informally specified, there is no way to automatically
determine ground truth. Thus, it is infeasible to directly calculate the accuracy of BCause’s
causal graphs. Instead, I indirectly measure BCause’s accuracy by building a tool for which
ground truth is available and then calculating its accuracy.
Specifically, I build a tool called AdBlame that uses BCause’s causal graph to predict
a web application’s bandwidth consumption with ad blocking enabled. Ad blockers contain
comprehensive community-maintained filter lists that determine which network requests
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Object Type Properties Action Notes
HTMLElement style Set Contains CSS as text; scans for
uses of URL()
HTMLIFrameElement src Set
HTMLImageElement src Set
HTMLImageElement srcset Set Contains list of images
HTMLLinkElement href Set Uses proxy to intercept and scan
CSS contents for uses of URL()
HTMLMediaElement N/A Add to DOM URL read via currentSrc or src
HTMLScriptElement src Set
HTMLStyleElement N/A Add to DOM Contains CSS as text; scans for
uses of URL()
Window fetch Call
XMLHttpRequest send Call
Table 5.2: Program actions that initiate network requests. AdBlame uses BCause’s ex-
isting hook infrastructure to log when these program actions occur. While this list is not
exhaustive, it is sufficient to accurately predict the bandwidth consumption of production
websites. Using BCause, AdBlame can easily install additional hooks to support addi-
tional interfaces.
should be blocked. AdBlame uses BCause’s causal graph and these filter lists to determine
which network requests depend on blocked content. In order to track network requests,
AdBlame augments BCause’s traces with network request entries that log program actions
that trigger network requests. AdBlame uses BCause’s existing hook infrastructure to
intercept the program actions listed in Table 5.2 that may initiate network requests, and
to associate them with nodes in the causal graph. It then combines the causal graph with
a network log from the proxy, which contains the time and size of each network request on
the wire, to estimate the bandwidth consumption of a web application execution with ad
blocking enabled.
To measure the utility of the causal information for this particular application, I compare
AdBlame against an approach that runs the filter list directly on the network log. I expect
that this straightforward approach will not work well; filter lists are intended to block
advertising network scripts that the page directly embeds, and not all URLs that serve
advertising content. In addition, rules in a filter list can depend on the context of a network
request, such as whether it is a script element, subdocument (IFrame), or CSS stylesheet.
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Bandwidth Prediction (% Difference)
Website Ads No Ads AdBlame Network Filter
CNN.com 4749 KB 3379 KB 3304 KB (2.2%) 4606 KB (36.3%)
Dictionary.com 1904 KB 515 KB 515 KB (0.0%) 1024 KB (98.8%)
Weather.com 5159 KB 3789 KB 3868 KB (2.1%) 4428 KB (16.9%)
Table 5.3: AdBlame’s accuracy on our benchmark web sites. AdBlame’s predictions are
within 2.2% of the ground truth. In contrast, directly applying the filter list to the network
log of each visit is significantly less accurate.
I infer the context as best I can with the network log using the MIME type specified in
the header of each HTTP response, although I note that servers do not always specify the
correct MIME type. I map HTML MIME types to subdocuments, JavaScript MIME types
to scripts, CSS MIME types to stylesheet, image MIME types to image, and the rest to no
particular context.
To measure the ground truth, I load each webpage in Chrome with uBlock Origin and use
Chrome’s built-in developer tools to record bandwidth consumption [41]. I configure uBlock,
BCause, and the baseline approach to use two community maintained filter lists, EasyList
and EasyPrivacy [36], as they are comprehensive and portable across ad blockers and filter
list parsers. For benchmarks, I chose three major websites that contain a significant number
of advertisements: CNN.com, Dictionary.com, and Weather.com. I visit the front page of
each site twice, with BCause and with uBlock, and wait for all graphical content within
the browser viewport to finish loading. Both predictions and the bandwidth consumption
of the web page with ads are derived from data collected during BCause’s run. Table 5.3
contains the results of this experiment.
AdBlame’s predictions are within 2.2% of the ground truth. The difference from
ground truth can be explained by natural deviations in the content of each web application
between visits, network requests initiated by program actions not included in Table 5.2,
and slight differences in web application behavior between the two runs caused by disabled
browser features like ServiceWorkers. In contrast, directly applying the filter lists to the
network log results in predictions that are, on average, within 50% of the ground truth.
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These results suggest that BCause’s causal graphs are accurate, as they were necessary to
produce accurate bandwidth consumption predictions.
5.5.2 Overhead
To evaluate the runtime overhead of our BCause prototype, I run the Speedometer 2.0
benchmark suite in the Chromium browser with and without BCause [21]. Speedometer
repeatedly loads different to-do list implementations in an iframe. This behavior is nearly
a worst-case scenario for BCause, as each iframe reload causes a new BCause agent to
instantiate and install hooks for the new document. I also note that I have not spent any
time optimizing BCause to improve performance, as our primary goal is producing accurate
models of web application behavior. I run the experiment in Chromium 68.0.3419.0 on an
2015 MacBook Pro with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16GB of RAM.
Overall, BCause imposes a 2.58X slowdown on Speedometer 2.0. Much of
this overhead is due to initialization overhead. I believe this is acceptable overhead for a
debugging tool.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented BCause, a framework for understanding a web application’s
asynchronous behavior. BCause produces a trace of a web application’s execution, and uses
that trace to build a causal graph of its events. BCause requires no browser changes, and
uses existing WebIDL files to automatically determine most causal links between events. I
demonstrate the accuracy of BCause’s causal graphs by building AdBlame, which predicts
the impact of ad blocking policies on bandwidth consumption to within 2.2% on a suite of
production web applications.
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CHAPTER 6
DOPPIO: BREAKING THE BROWSER LANGUAGE BARRIER
Developers are unable to reuse code written in conventional programming languages
in the browser because the browser does not provide the environment that these languages
expect. The browser lacks synchronous blocking I/O, multiple threads of execution, and tra-
ditional operating system services. As a result, directly translating the code into JavaScript
is not generally possible.
This chapter identifies and describes how to resolve the impedance mismatch between
the browser and the native environment that conventional programming languages expect.
I present Doppio, a runtime system that makes it possible to execute unmodified applica-
tions written in conventional programming languages inside the browser [143]. Its execu-
tion environment overcomes the limitations of the JavaScript single-threaded event-driven
runtime model by providing language implementations with emulated threads that sup-
port suspending and resuming execution to enable blocking I/O and multithreading in the
source language. To support standard library and language features, Doppio provides com-
mon POSIX-like operating system abstractions including a file system abstraction, network
sockets, and an unmanaged heap for dynamic memory allocation.
I demonstrate the feasibility of using Doppio through two case studies. I present the
DoppioJVM, a prototype yet robust implementation of a Java Virtual Machine interpreter
on top of Doppio that can run complex unmodified JVM programs in the browser without
plugin support. I show that the combination of Doppio and the DoppioJVM makes
it possible to run full, unmodified JVM applications inside a wide range of browsers. I
also demonstrate Doppio’s generality by augmenting an existing C/C++ to JavaScript
compiler, Emscripten [153], with Doppio and present a case study of porting a C++ game
to the browser.
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Figure 6.1: A diagram of the Doppio runtime system. The Doppio runtime system makes
it possible for existing programs to execute in an unmodified browser via its virtualized ex-
ecution environment and operating system abstractions. This diagram displays the various
components of Doppio at a high level, and illustrates how language implementations, such
as DoppioJVM, rely on them.
6.1 Execution Environment
In this section, I describe how Doppio’s entirely JavaScript-based execution environ-
ment automatically segments existing programs into finite-duration events to keep the web
page responsive, emulates synchronous APIs in the source language in terms of asynchronous
JavaScript APIs, and implements multithreading.
6.1.1 Automatic Event Segmentation
To cope with the browser’s execution model, Doppio must break up the execution of
existing programs into finite-duration events. To perform this task, Doppio’s execution
environment contains a mechanism called suspend-and-resume that allows an executing
program to suspend itself to the heap to be resumed later, letting other events in the browser
event queue like user input execute. Because this mechanism is not natively available in
JavaScript, languages implemented using Doppio must satisfy two properties:
The call stack must be explicitly stored in JavaScript objects. JavaScript lacks
comprehensive introspection APIs and has no mechanism for saving stack state. As a result,
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programs executing in Doppio can only reliably use the JavaScript stack for transient state
that will not be needed for program resumption.
The program must be augmented to periodically check if it should suspend.
JavaScript lacks preemption: once an event starts executing, it will continue executing
until it completes or is killed by the browser. As a result, a language implemented using
Doppio must call the execution environment periodically to check if it should suspend
execution to free up the JavaScript thread.
With an explicit call stack representation in hand, the Doppio execution environment
can suspend a program for later resumption. To do so, it first creates an anonymous
function—the resumption callback— that captures the call stack in a closure and that con-
tains the logic needed to resume the program. It then passes the function to an asynchronous
browser mechanism such as setImmediate that will invoke it later. Finally, it notifies the
language implementation that it should halt execution, with a promise that it will handle
resuming the program from that point later.
To prevent applications from executing for too long, Doppio uses a counter to determine
when an application needs to suspend. Each suspend check initiated by the language
implementation decrements the counter by 1; when the counter reaches 0, the application
needs to suspend. Doppio resets the counter to an appropriate value calculated using a
cumulative moving average of how often the program checks the counter.
6.1.2 Emulating Blocking with Asynchronous APIs
Using a variant of suspend-and-resume, Doppio makes it possible to emulate a syn-
chronous API in the source language in terms of an asynchronous JavaScript API. When it
wishes to invoke an asynchronous JavaScript function, the language implementation must
craft a callback function that encapsulates the logic for migrating the data provided through
the asynchronous API into items that the language can understand. Doppio wraps this
callback in a variation of the resumption callback, and then calls the asynchronous API
with the modified callback function. When the browser triggers the resumption callback,
the program executing in Doppio resumes as if it had just received data synchronously
from a regular function call in its language.
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6.1.3 Multithreading Support
Doppio implements multithreading by exploiting the fact that programs executing
in Doppio maintain an explicit representation of their stack. Since JavaScript lacks a
mechanism for preempting execution, multithreading is necessarily cooperative from the
JavaScript point of view. However, as language implementations must voluntarily specify
valid context switches to Doppio, the semantics of multithreading may be preemptive in
the source language.
Doppio provides language implementations with a mechanism for switching threads,
which is a variation of the suspend-and-resume functionality. Doppio maintains a “thread
pool” – essentially an array of call stacks. When the language implementation determines
that it is time for a context switch, Doppio saves the call stack of the currently running
thread into this array, and chooses another thread to resume. Language implementations
can provide a scheduling function that determines which thread to resume. By default,
Doppio uses a weighted round robin scheduling policy.
6.2 OS Services
The web browser lacks a number of core operating system features that existing programs
depend on, such as the file system, access to unmanaged memory, and network sockets. As
a result, these abstractions must be implemented in terms of the resources available in the
browser so that arbitrary programs can run in the web environment. This section outlines
how Doppio implements these abstractions.
6.2.1 File System
Browsers provide a hodgepodge of persistent storage mechanisms with different storage
formats, restrictions, compatibility across browsers, and intended use cases. Many do not
expose synchronous interfaces, making it impossible to implement a blocking file system on
top of them.
However, by combining Doppio’s thread emulation with a unified asynchronous file-
based storage abstraction, Doppio can provide existing programs with the synchronous file
system semantics they expect, with high compatibility across browsers. Doppio’s filesystem
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has two primary components: (1) an implementation of the Node.js file system API, which
is a light JavaScript wrapper around POSIX-like file system calls, and (2) a backend API
for defining different “file system” backends for each persistent storage solution. Doppio
contains backends for six separate file storage mechanisms, including browser-local storage,
zip files, and Dropbox cloud storage.
6.2.2 Unmanaged Heap
Programs use the unmanaged heap either to perform unsafe memory operations (in
managed languages), or as the source of dynamically allocated memory (in unmanaged
languages). Doppio emulates the unmanaged heap using a straightforward first-fit memory
allocator that operates on JavaScript arrays. Data stored to and read from Doppio’s heap
are actually copied; updates must be kept in sync according to the language’s semantics.
6.2.3 TCP Sockets
For security reasons, browsers do not provide JavaScript applications with direct access
to network sockets. Instead, browsers provide a feature called WebSockets that enable
JavaScript applications to make outgoing full-duplex TCP connections with WebSocket
servers. JavaScript applications cannot accept incoming WebSocket connections.
WebSocket connections use a custom handshake and data frame format. However,
existing socket-based servers and clients expect a standard TCP handshake and the ability
to define custom application-layer data frame formats. As a result, they will not be able to
send or receive WebSocket connections out of the box.
Resolving this problem requires a solution for clients running in the browser that make
outgoing socket connections, and servers running on native hardware that expect incoming
socket connections. Doppio resolves the client side of the issue by emulating a Unix socket
API in terms of WebSocket functionality. The freely-available Websockify program provides
a solution for the server end of the problem; it wraps unmodified programs, and translates
incoming WebSocket connections into normal TCP connections [78].
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6.3 DoppioJVM
To demonstrate Doppio’s suitability as a full-featured operating environment for execut-
ing unaltered applications written in conventional programming languages, I built Doppi-
oJVM. DoppioJVM is a robust prototype Java Virtual Machine (JVM) interpreter that
operates entirely in JavaScript. This section describes a number of DoppioJVM’s key
features, and how they rely on support provided by Doppio.
6.3.1 Segmented Execution
Due to the JavaScript execution model, DoppioJVM must execute as finite-duration
events to prevent the browser from stopping its execution. DoppioJVM uses Doppio’s
suspend-and-resume functionality to achieve this. However, it must satisfy the requirements
outlined in Section 6.1.1 before it can use this mechanism.
DoppioJVM contains a straightforward JavaScript representation of the JVM call
stack. Each stack frame contains an operand stack and an array of local variables. The call
stack is simply an array of these stack frame objects. To ensure that execution suspends in
a timely fashion, DoppioJVM checks at each backwards jump and function call whether
it should suspend.
6.3.2 Multithreading
DoppioJVM uses Doppio’s “thread pool” to emulate multiple JVM threads. Doppio-
JVM checks for waiting threads at fixed context switch points, such as JVM monitor checks,
atomic operations, any other form of lock-checking, and each time Doppio suspends-and-
resumes execution.
6.3.3 Native Methods
The Java Class Library exposes JVM interfaces to a wide variety of native functionality,
such as the file system, unsafe memory operations, and network connections. These methods
cannot be implemented using JVM bytecodes, and are marked as “native”. DoppioJVM
implements these native methods directly in JavaScript to interact with Doppio’s operating
system services.
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6.3.4 Class Loading
The DoppioJVM class loader uses the Doppio file system to lazily download and parse
JVM class files and JAR files. Using the file system, DoppioJVM makes the entire Java
Class Library available in the browser.
6.3.5 Exceptions
The JVM is natively aware of exceptions and exception-handling logic. However, because
DoppioJVM uses Doppio to execute as finite-length events, it cannot use JavaScript’s
native exception mechanisms to emulate JVM exceptions. Instead, DoppioJVM emulates
JVM exception handling semantics by iterating through its virtual stack representation
until it finds a stack frame with an applicable exception handler, or until it empties the
stack and exits with an error.
6.3.6 JVM Objects and Arrays
DoppioJVM maps JVM objects to JavaScript objects, where each object contains a
reference to its class and a dictionary that contains all of its fields keyed on their names.
JVM arrays are a special type of JVM object; these are mapped to a JavaScript object
that contains an array of values and a reference to the special array class that the JVM
constructs according to the array’s component type. DoppioJVM takes full advantage of
the JavaScript garbage collector, which automatically collects JVM objects when they fall
out of scope.
6.4 Evaluation
6.4.1 Case Study 1: DoppioJVM
I evaluate DoppioJVM’s completeness and performance on a set of real and unmodi-
fied complex JVM programs across a wide variety of browsers. I compare DoppioJVM’s
performance to Oracle’s HotSpot JVM interpreter provided with OpenJDK.
The benchmarks and their respective workloads are as follows: javap (4KLOC) is the
Java disassembler from OpenJDK 6, which I run on the 491 compiled class files of javac.
javac (44KLOC) is the Java compiler from OpenJDK 6, which I run on the 19 source
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Figure 6.2: DoppioJVM’s performance on the benchmark applications relative to the
HotSpot JVM interpreter bundled with Java 6. DoppioJVM runs between 24× and 42×
slower (geometric mean: 32×) than the HotSpot interpreter in Google Chrome. Note that
javap’s poor performance in Safari is due to a browser bug.
files of javap. Rhino 1.7 (57KLOC) is an implementation of the JavaScript language on
the JVM, which I run on the recursive and binary-trees programs from the SunSpider
0.9.1 benchmark suite. Kawa-Scheme 1.13 (121KLOC) is an implementation of the Scheme
language on the JVM, which I evaluate on the nqueens algorithm with input 8.
The benchmark computer is a Mac Mini running OS X 10.8.4 with a 4-core 2GHz
Intel Core i7 processor and 8GB of 1333 MHz DDR3 RAM. I evaluate DoppioJVM in
Chrome 28.0, Firefox 22.0, Safari 6.0.5, Opera 12.16, and Internet Explorer 10, with Internet
Explorer 10 running in a Windows 8 virtual machine using the Parallels 8 software.
DoppioJVM is able to successfully execute all of these applications to completion; I
did not need to make any modifications to these applications. Figure 6.2 presents execution
times across various browsers versus Oracle’s HotSpot interpreter. DoppioJVM achieves
its highest performance on Chrome: compared to the HotSpot interpreter, DoppioJVM
runs between 24× and 42× slower (geometric mean: 32×). This performance degradation is
explained by two facts: first, DoppioJVM is largely untuned; second, it pays the price for
executing on top of JavaScript and inside the browser. By contrast, the HotSpot interpreter
is a highly tuned native executable.
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While running the javap benchmark, I discovered a bug in Safari that causes significant
performance degradation. I have reported this issue to Apple, and it has since been fixed.1
6.4.2 Case Study 2: Doppio and C++
To further demonstrate Doppio’s utility and generality, I combined Doppio with Em-
scripten, extending its ability to port C++ applications to the browser. As a case study,
I used it to to run the C++ game Me and My Shadow in the browser. The Emscripten
developers previously ported the core of this game to the web, but the port was incomplete:
because Emscripten does not support synchronous dynamic file loading and does not back
files to a persistent storage mechanism, the Emscripten demo needs to load all of the games
assets into memory prior to execution and does not support game saving.
I modified Emscripten to use the Doppio file system, which is able to download the static
game assets synchronously as the game requires them, and back the game’s configuration
folder to localStorage. I did not need to modify the game in order to do this; I took
the same source code that the Emscripten developers used to make their demo, compiled it
with an augmented version of Emscripten, and configured the Doppio file system to mount
the game’s resources and the browser’s persistent storage at appropriate folders in the file
system hierarchy. The resulting demo does not preload any files, and is able to write to the
file system to save game progress and settings.
6.5 Conclusion
While web browsers have become ubiquitous and so are an attractive target for appli-
cation developers, they support just one programming language—JavaScript—and offer an
idiosyncratic execution environment that lacks many of the features that most programs
require, including file systems, blocking I/O, and multiple threads. They also are incredibly
diverse, further complicating the task of programming web-based applications.
This chapter presented Doppio, a runtime system for the browser that breaks the
browser language barrier. Doppio addresses the challenges needed to execute programs
1See https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119049
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written in general-purpose languages inside the browser by providing key system services and
runtime support that abstracts away the many differences across browsers. Using Doppio, I
built DoppioJVM, a proof-of-concept complete implementation of a Java Virtual Machine
in JavaScript. DoppioJVM makes it possible for the first time to run unmodified, off-
the-shelf applications written in a conventional programming language directly inside the
browser. DoppioJVM is already deployed as the compilation and execution engine for the
educational website CodeMoo.com, which teaches students how to program in Java [126].
I further demonstrate Doppio’s utility by combining it with Emscripten, extending its
ability to port C++ applications to the browser. Tens of millions of visitors to the Internet
Archive have used Doppio and Emscripten to run historical software, such as The Oregon
Trail and Windows 3.1, directly in their browsers [122]. Doppio is available for download
at http://www.doppiojvm.org/.
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CHAPTER 7
BROWSIX: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN UNIX AND THE
BROWSER
The previous chapter described Doppio, a POSIX-like runtime system for single process
applications. While Doppio makes it significantly easier to re-use code written in conven-
tional languages in the browser, it can only run a single process at a time and provides
limited support for sockets and synchronous I/O at the JavaScript level.
To overcome these limitations, I introduce Browsix, a framework that brings Unix
abstractions to the browser through a shared kernel and common system-call conventions,
bridging the gap between conventional operating systems and the browser [111]. Browsix
consists of two core components: (1) a JavaScript-only operating system that exposes a
wide array of OS services that applications expect (including pipes, concurrent processes,
signals, sockets, and a shared file system); and (2) extended JavaScript runtimes for C, C++,
Go, and Node.js that let unmodified programs written in these languages and compiled to
JavaScript run directly in the browser.
7.1 Browsix OS Support
The core of Browsix’s OS support is a kernel that controls access to shared Unix
services. Unix services, including the shared file system, pipes, sockets, and task struc-
tures, live inside the kernel, which runs as a JavaScript library in the main browser thread.
Processes run separately and in parallel inside Web Workers, and access Browsix kernel
services through a system call abstraction.
7.1.1 Kernel
The kernel lives in the main JavaScript context alongside the web application and acts as
the intermediary between processes and loosely coupled Unix subsystems. Processes issue
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Class System calls
Process Management fork, spawn, pipe2, wait4, exit
Process Metadata chdir, getcwd, getpid
Sockets socket, bind, getsockname listen, accept, connect
Directory IO readdir, getdents, rmdir, mkdir
File IO open, close, unlink, llseek, pread, pwrite
File Metadata access, fstat, lstat, stat, readlink, utimes
Table 7.1: A representative list of the system calls implemented by the Browsix kernel.
fork is only supported for C and C++ programs.
system calls to the kernel to access shared resources, the kernel routes these requests to the
appropriate subsystem, and the subsystems relay responses back to the relevant processes.
The kernel also dispatches signals to processes. Table 7.1 presents a partial list of the system
calls that the kernel currently supports.
7.1.2 System Calls
The Browsix kernel supports two types of system calls: asynchronous and synchronous.
Asynchronous system calls work in all modern browsers, but impose a high performance
penalty on C and C++ programs. Synchronous system calls enable higher performance for
C and C++ programs, but use newly proposed browser features that are not yet available
in some browsers.
Asynchronous System Calls: Browsix implements asynchronous system calls in a
continuation-passing style (CPS). A process initiates a system call by sending a message to
the kernel with a process-specific unique ID, the system call number, and arguments. The
process is then required to suspend its execution, a` la Doppio. When the kernel sends a
response, the Web Worker process executes the continuation (or callback) with response
values, resuming the process’s execution.
Synchronous System Calls: Synchronous system calls work by sharing a view of a pro-
cess’s address space between the kernel and the process, similar to a traditional operating
system kernel like Linux. Synchronous system calls reduce copying overhead and do not
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require processes to suspend their execution. This feature uses the experimental SharedAr-
rayBuffer interface that will eventually become available in all browsers.
A process invokes a synchronous system call by sending a message as in the asynchronous
case, but with arguments limited to integers and integer offsets (representing pointers) into
the shared memory array. Then, the process performs a blocking wait on a specific offset
into the SharedArrayBuffer and is awakened when the system call has completed or a signal
is received.
7.1.3 Processes
Browsix relies on Web Workers as the foundation for emulating Unix processes. Each
Browsix process has an associated task structure in the kernel that contains its process
ID, parent’s process ID, Web Worker object, current working directory, and map of open
file descriptors. Processes can share state via the file system, send signals to one another,
spawn sub-processes to perform tasks in parallel, and connect processes together using pipes.
Below, I describe how Browsix maps familiar OS interfaces onto Web Workers.
spawn: spawn lets a process construct a new process from a specified executable on the
file system. In Browsix, executables are JavaScript files or files beginning with a shebang
line. When a process invokes spawn, Browsix creates a new task structure with the
specified resources and working directory, and creates a new Web Worker that runs the
target executable or interpreter.
fork: The fork system call creates a new process containing a copy of the current address
space and call stack. Fork returns twice – first with a value of zero in the new process, and
with the PID of the new process in the original. Web Workers do not expose a cloning API,
and JavaScript lacks the reflection primitives required to serialize a context’s entire state
into a snapshot. Thus, Browsix only supports fork when a language runtime is able to
completely enumerate and serialize its own state.
wait4: The wait4 system call reaps child processes that have finished executing. It returns
immediately if the specified child has already exited, or the WNOHANG option is specified.
Waiting requires that the kernel not immediately free task structures, and required us to
implement the zombie task state for children that have not yet been waited upon. The C
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library used by Emscripten, musl, uses the wait4 system call to implement the C library
functions wait, wait3, and waitpid.
exit: Language runtimes with Browsix-support are required to explicitly issue an exit
system call when they are done executing, as the containing Web Worker context has
no way to know that the process has finished. This is due to the event-based nature of
JavaScript environments – even if there are no pending events in the Worker’s queue, the
main JavaScript context could, from the perspective of the browser, send the Worker a
message at any time.
7.1.4 Pipes
Browsix pipes are implemented as in-memory buffers with wait queues. If there is no
data to be read when a process issues a read system call, Browsix enqueues the callback
encapsulating the system call response which it invokes when data is written to the pipe.
Similarly, if there is not enough free space in a pipe’s internal buffer for a write request,
Browsix waits until enough space frees up in the buffer from read requests to complete
the write.
7.1.5 Sockets
Browsix implements a subset of the BSD/POSIX socket API, with support for SOCK-
STREAM (TCP) sockets for communicating between Browsix processes. These sockets
enable servers that bind, listen and then accept new connections on a socket, along with
clients that connect to a socket server, with both client and server reading and writing
from the connected file descriptor. Sockets are sequenced, reliable, bi-directional streams.
7.1.6 Shared File System
Browsix uses and extendsDoppio’s file system to support multiple processes. Browsix’s
file system adds locking operations to the filesystem to prevent operations from different
processes from interleaving, which may cause the filesystem to enter a bad state. In addi-
tion, child processes inherit open file descriptors from their parents, and processes may end
without closing file descriptors. Browsix uses reference counting to appropriately close
open file descriptors.
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7.2 Browsix Runtime Support
Applications invoke Browsix system calls indirectly through their runtime systems.
This section describes the runtime support added to GopherJS, Emscripten, and Node.js
along with the APIs exposed to web applications so they can execute programs in Browsix.
7.2.1 Browser Environment Extensions
Web applications run alongside the Browsix kernel in the main browser context, and
have access to Browsix features through several global APIs. Browsix exposes new APIs
for process creation, file access, and socket notifications, and an XMLHttpRequest-like
interface to send HTTP requests to Browsix processes. Using these interfaces, developers
can easily integrate Browsix processes into their web applications.
7.2.2 Runtime-specific Integration
For many programming languages, existing language runtimes targeted for the browser
must bridge the impedance mismatch between synchronous APIs present on Unix-like sys-
tems and the asynchronous world of the browser. DoppioJVM uses Doppio’s execution
environment to bridge this gap in a general manner, while compile-to-JavaScript systems
like Emscripten and GopherJS employ different approaches. Since Browsix supports both
synchronous and asynchronous system calls, language runtimes can choose the system call
convention most appropriate for their implementation.
This section describes the runtime support added to language runtimes for Go, C/C++,
and Node.js. Extending Browsix support to additional language runtimes remains as
future work.
Go: Supporting Go involves extending the existing GopherJS compiler and runtime to sup-
port issuing and waiting for system calls under Browsix. In particular, the modifications
change the existing syscall.RawSyscall function to invoke Browsix system calls.
C and C++: Supporting C/C++ involves modifying Emscripten, a C and C++ compiler
that targets JavaScript, to implement stubbed out system calls in its runtime. Browsix-
enhanced Emscripten supports two modes - synchronous system calls and asynchronous
system calls, one of which is selected at compile time. Asynchronous system calls require
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use of Emscripten’s interpreter mode (named the “Emterpreter”) to save and restore the
C stack a` la Doppio. With synchronous system calls, Emscripten can compile the entire
application to asm.js, an extremely optimizable subset of JavaScript.
Node.js: Node.js (a.k.a. “Node”) is a platform for building servers and command line tools
with JavaScript, implemented in C, C++ and JavaScript on top of the V8 JavaScript engine.
Node.js APIs are JavaScript modules that are loaded into the current JavaScript context.
These high-level APIs are implemented in platform-agnostic JavaScript and call into lower-
level C++ bindings, which in turn invoke operating system interfaces like filesystem IO,
TCP sockets, and child process management. Browsix replaces these C++ bindings with
pure JavaScript replacements that invoke Browsix system calls.
7.3 Evaluation
The evaluation answers the following questions: (1) Does bringing Unix abstractions
into the browser enable compelling use cases? (2) Is the performance impact of running
programs under Browsix acceptable?
7.3.1 Case Studies
This section evaluates the applicability and advantages of bringing Unix abstractions
into the browser with three case studies: a LATEX editor, a meme generator with server that
can run in-browser or in the cloud, and a Unix terminal backed by dash, a widely-used
POSIX shell.
7.3.1.1 LATEX Editor
The editor presents a split-screen view to the user, with the document’s LATEX source
on the left, and generated PDF preview on the right. The editor’s UI is a standard web
application, and represents the only new code. When the user clicks on the “Build PDF”
button, the editor uses Browsix to invoke GNU Make in a Browsix process, which rebuilds
the PDF. Make then runs pdflatex and bibtex, depending on whether the user has updated
the references file. Once all steps have completed, the editor reads the PDF from Browsix’s
file system and displays it to the user.
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(a) Meme creator running without Browsix
(b) Meme creator running with Browsix
Figure 7.1: System diagram of the meme generator application with and without Browsix,
demonstrating how the client and server interact with one another. With Browsix, the
server runs in the browser without code modifications.
7.3.1.2 Meme Generator
The meme generator lets users create memes consisting of images with (nominally)
humorous overlaid text. Existing services, such as MemeGenerator.net, perform meme
generation server-side. Moving meme creation into the browser would reduce server load and
reduce latency when the network is overloaded or unreliable, but doing so would normally
present a significant engineering challenge. The meme generation server uses sockets to
communicate with the browser over HTTP and reads meme templates from the file system.
Before Browsix, the client and server code would need to be re-architected and rewritten
to run together in the browser.
To demonstrate Browsix’s ability to quickly port code from the server to the web, the
meme creator is implemented as a traditional client/server web application; Figure 7.1a
contains a system diagram. The client is implemented in HTML5 and JavaScript, and the
server is written in Go. The server reads base images and font files from the filesystem,
and uses off-the-shelf third-party Go libraries for image manipulation and font rendering
95
to produce memes [39]. The server also uses Go’s built-in http module to run its web
server. This server is stateless, following best practices [80]; porting a stateful server would
naturally require more care.
To port the server code to Browsix, I recompile it in GopherJS with Browsix runtime
extensions. I add a policy to the web application the dynamically routes meme generation
requests to a server running in Browsix when running on a desktop or to the cloud when
not. Figure 7.1b displays a system diagram of the modified meme generator.
7.3.1.3 The Browsix Terminal
To make it easy for developers to interact with and test programs in Browsix, I im-
plement an in-browser Unix terminal that exposes a POSIX shell. The terminal uses the
Debian Almquist shell (dash), the default shell of Debian and Ubuntu. I compile dash to
JavaScript using Browsix-enhanced Emscripten, and run it in a Browsix process.
Since the Browsix terminal uses a standard shell, developers can use it to run ex-
isting and new shell scripts in Browsix. Developers can pipe programs together (e.g.
cat file.txt | grep apple > apples.txt), execute programs in a subshell in the back-
ground with &, run shell scripts, and change environment variables. Developers can also
execute Go, C/C++, and Node.js programs from the shell as expected.
7.3.2 Performance
I evaluate the performance overhead of Browsix on two of the case studies. All exper-
iments were performed on a late-2013 Macbook Pro with an Intel i7-4558U CPU and 16
GB of RAM, running Linux 4.8. Safari performance numbers are from the same machine
running macOS Sierra.
LATEX Editor: Running pdflatex under Browsix imposes an order of magnitude slow-
down, as shown in Table 7.2. A native execution of pdflatex under Linux takes around
86 milliseconds on a single page document with a bibliography. When using synchronous
system calls, the same document builds in Browsix in between 0.79 and 2.6 seconds, a
slowdown of between 9× and 31×. Due to a limitation in Firefox, using a SharedArray-
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Platform Runtime
Linux 0.086s
Chrome Beta 56 2.0s (24×)
Firefox Nightly 54 2.6s (31×)
Firefox Nightly 54* 0.79s (9×)
Safari Tech Preview 22 1.8s (21×)
Table 7.2: Execution times for compiling a single-page document with a bibliography with
pdflatex from TeX Live 2015. Times reported are the mean of 10 executions. (* Indi-
cates Firefox was built with an 8-line patch enabling asm.js validation with the use of
SharedArrayBuffers.)
Buffer disables certain asm.js optimizations in the JavaScript JIT.1 The modified Firefox
results show that if the rules for asm.js are slightly relaxed to allow SharedArrayBuffers
for the heap, performance is improved by over 3×. Building pdflatex with asynchronous
system calls and the Emterpreter for broader compatibility with today’s browsers increases
runtime to around 12 seconds.
Meme Generator: The meme generator performs two types of HTTP requests to the
server: requests for a list of available background images, and requests to generate a meme.
I benchmark the performance of the meme generator server running natively and running
in Browsix in both Google Chrome 52 and Mozilla Firefox 48. Times reported are the mean
of 100 runs following a 20-run warmup.
On average, a request for a list of background images takes 1.7 milliseconds natively,
9 ms in Chrome, and 6 ms in Firefox. A request to generate a meme in Browsix takes
approximately two seconds, compared to 200 ms when running server-side. The former
request is faster than a typical server request once roundtrip latencies are factored in, but
the latter is slower, likely due to the lack of native 64-bit integers in the web platform. I
expect performance to improve when future browsers support native access to 64-bit integers
through WebAssembly.
1https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1334941
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7.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced Browsix, a framework that brings the essence of Unix to
the browser. Browsix makes it almost trivial to build complex web applications from
components written in a variety of languages without modifying any code, and promises
to significantly reduce the effort required to build highly sophisticated web applications.
Browsix is open source, and is freely available at https://browsix.org.
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CHAPTER 8
RELATED WORK
This section describes related work on time-travel debugging and deterministic replay,
memory leak debugging, understanding program behavior, and porting existing code to the
browser.
8.1 Time-Travel Debugging and Deterministic Replay
AlthoughMcFly is the first time-traveling debugger for web applications, time-traveling
debuggers exist in several other non-graphical settings (§8.1.1). Plain record-and-replay
systems exist for GUI applications, but these are unable to support time-travel debugging
at interactive speeds because they cannot checkpoint and roll back program and visual
state (§8.1.2). Table 8.1 summarizes prior work that supports replaying web application
executions.
8.1.1 Time-Travel Debugging
McFly is the first time-traveling debugger for web applications. Previous time-traveling
debuggers for other settings fall into three main categories: application-level debuggers,
VM-level debuggers, and omniscient debuggers.
Application-level: Tardis [13], Jardis [14], UndoDB [125], Boothe [20], and RR [104]
record and replay program interactions with a well-defined interface to an external envi-
ronment, but do not recreate state in the external environment during debugging. In other
words, these debuggers do not recreate a GUI application’s visual state. Tardis and Jardis
debug .NET CLR and Node.js programs respectively, and replays interactions with native
(C/C++) methods. UndoDB, RR, and Boothe debug the user space of processes, and
replay interactions with the kernel and hardware. Boothe and RR use a similar optimiza-
tion as McFly to recreate checkpoints during replay to amortize time-travel cost. RR can
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Program GUI Debugs Step-backward
System Replay Support Web Apps Support
Record and replay systems:
Timelapse [22] 3 3∗ 3
Mugshot [83] 3 3∗ 3
Jalangi [116] 3 3
Time-traveling debuggers:
RR [104] 3 3
Jardis [14] 3 3
McFly 3 3 3 3
Table 8.1: Comparison of prior time-traveling debuggers and record and replay systems.
McFly is the first time-traveling debugger for web applications. No prior debugger is able
to support step-backward debugger commands with GUI support at interactive speed. *
indicates that the system does not correctly reproduce data races between the layout engine
and JavaScript.
step forwards and backwards through a Firefox execution, but it is designed to debug the
browser itself rather than web applications and imposes single-threaded browser execution
at all times.
VM-level: VM-level hypervisors like XenTT [24], ReVirt [34, 35], ReTrace [151], and
TTVM [67] can time-travel entire virtual machines, but at the expense of large program
traces and slow time-travel. Reverse-step debugging, like that provided by McFly, requires
time-travel at interactive speeds to be practical.
Omniscient: Omniscient debuggers provide time-traveling features by recording program
state changes after every instruction, which produces large program traces and imposes
high overhead during execution. Examples of omniscient debuggers include Chronon [28],
TOD [110], ODB [71], and Tralfamadore [69].
8.1.2 Deterministic Replay
Pure deterministic replay systems can record and replay an application’s execution,
but do not support periodic checkpoints or reverse debugging. As a result, these systems
are unable to support backwards stepping operations at interactive speeds. I center the
discussion on three different runtime environments.
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Browser: Mugshot [83] and Timelapse [22] deterministically replay web application exe-
cutions by recording and replaying the event schedule and I/O operations; I compare these
systems to McFly in Table 8.1. To accomplish this goal, Mugshot uses program rewrit-
ing and JavaScript reflection while Timelapse modifies the WebKit layout engine. While
McFly also modifies the layout engine, Timelapse’s “hypervisor-like record/replay strat-
egy relies on the layered architecture of WebKit” and is not portable to other browsers;
in contrast, McFly’s architecture builds on web standards that are supported across all
major browsers. Neither system is able to provide step-backward debugger commands at
interactive speeds because they are unable to capture application checkpoints. Furthermore,
Mugshot and Timelapse do not support layout engine operations that mutate visual state
in parallel with JavaScript execution, such as CSS animations, which can cause divergent
application replays.
Jalangi [116] supports selectively recording and replaying a subset of a program’s code in
support of dynamic analyses. On the user-selected subset of code, Jalangi logs and replays
interactions with the browser’s native functions with considerable overhead (26X during
recording and 30x during replay), and does not support visual state during replay.
Android: The Android runtime environment is similar to the browser environment in
that applications are event-driven and use a single thread to update the GUI. Valera [58]
and ReRan [40] interpose on the interface between Android applications and the Android
platform to capture nondeterministic event schedules and I/O operations.
JVM: JVM applications communicate with the environment and internal JVM compo-
nents via native methods. Existing record-and-replay systems for the JVM treat state
below the native methods, such as visual state, as external to replay. DejaVu assumes
all native methods are deterministic, preventing applications from using nondeterministic
APIs [25]. ORDER records and replays select nondeterministic APIs, preventing developers
from inspecting or observing JVM-external state, like the GUI, during replay [152].
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8.2 Memory Leak Debugging
BLeak is the first system for automatically debugging memory leaks in web applications.
Prior techniques in this space are inapplicable or ineffective for memory leaks found on the
web.
8.2.1 Web Application Memory Leak Detectors
BLeak automatically debugs memory leaks in modern web applications; past work in
this space is ineffective, out of date, or not sufficiently general. LeakSpot locates JavaScript
allocation and reference sites that produce and retain increasing numbers of objects over
time, and uses staleness as a heuristic to refine its output [115]. On real web applications,
LeakSpot typically reports over 50 different allocation and reference sites that developers
must manually inspect to identify and diagnose memory leaks. AjaxScope dynamically
detects leaks due to a bug in web browsers that has now been fixed [66]. JSWhiz stati-
cally analyzes code written with Google Closure type annotations to detect specific leak
patterns [108].
8.2.2 Web Application Memory Debugging
Some tools help web developers debug memory usage and present diagnostic information
that the developer must manually interpret to locate leaks (Section 2.2 describes Google
Chrome’s Development Tools). MemInsight summarizes and displays information about
the JavaScript heap, including per-object-type staleness information, the allocation site of
individual objects, and retaining paths in the heap [61]. Unlike BLeak, these tools do not
directly identify memory as leaking or identify the code responsible for leaks.
8.2.3 Growth-based Memory Leak Detection
LeakBot looks for patterns in the heap graphs of Java applications to find memory
leaks [91]. LeakBot assumes that leak roots own all of their leaking objects, but leaked
objects in web applications frequently have multiple owners. BLeak does not rely on
specific patterns, and uses round trips to the same visual state to identify leaking objects.
Cork uses static type information available in the JVM to locate types that appear to be
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No Browser Event Listener Implicit Async. DOM IFrame
System Modifications Registrations Causality Ops Support Support
Program understanding:
JSGraph [72] 3 † 3 3
Clematis [6] 3 3 †
Domino [73] 3 3 3
Race detection:
WebRacer [106] 3 † 3 3
EventRacer [113] 3 † 3 3
BCause 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 8.2: Feature comparison of systems that reason about the causality of JavaScript
events. Implicit Causality refers to the ability to understand program actions that trigger
events (Table 5.1) and DOM Support refers to the ability to track causality through HTML
elements in the DOM (excluding event listener registrations). A † in Async. Ops indicates
that that system does not support Promises.
the source of memory leaks. [63]. Cork is not applicable to dynamically typed languages
like JavaScript.
8.2.4 Staleness-based Memory Leak Detection
SWAT (C/C++), Sleigh (JVM), and Hound (C/C++) find leaking objects using a
staleness metric derived from the last time an object was accessed, and identify the call
site responsible for allocating them [19,53,103]. Leakpoint (C/C++) also identifies the last
point in the execution that referenced a leaking memory location [29]. As I show (§4.4.5),
staleness is ineffective for at least 77% of the memory leaks BLeak identifies .
8.2.5 Hybrid Leak Detection Approaches
Xu et al. identify leaks stemming from Java collections using a hybrid approach that
targets containers that grow in size over time and contain stale items. The vast majority
of memory leaks found by BLeak would not be considered stale (§4.4.5).
8.3 Causal Program Understanding for Web Applications
BCause is the first system to track the causality of all JavaScript events in an un-
modified web browser. Table 8.2 summarizes prior work that reason about the causality
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of JavaScript events, which provide uneven support for tracking event causality through
specific browser features.
JavaScript event causality: JSGraph [72] modifies the Chromium web browser to track
DOM modifications and JavaScript execution in order to reconstruct web attacks. Clema-
tis [6] and Domino [73] use JavaScript reflection to track event listener registrations, callback-
based asynchronous operations, and DOM event execution. Neither Clematis nor Domino
support tracking causality through IFrame elements or DOM mutations, which severely
limits their applicability to production web applications with advertisements. Although
Clematis logs DOM modifications to aid developers with debugging, it does not use this
information to track event causality. Unlike prior systems, BCause supports complex pro-
duction web applications containing numerous IFrames with no browser modifications.
JavaScript race detection: WebRacer [106] and EventRacer [113] build a happens-
before graph of JavaScript events to find data races. Neither system supports tracking the
happens-before relations in Table 5.1, and both require a modified WebKit-based browser.
InitRacer [1] detects specific types of data races that occur during web application initial-
ization. InitRacer does not build a happens-before graph or reason about event causality;
instead, it eagerly invokes event handlers after registration and monitors the web application
for uncaught exceptions.
Fine-grained data flow tracking: Scout [102] logs fine-grained data flows across the
JavaScript heap and the DOM, and has been used to determine dependencies among network
requests in order to improve page loading. It may be possible to extract event causality
from Scout’s detailed logs, which capture every DOM interaction and JavaScript event.
However, these logs are captured using heavyweight program instrumentation. Specifically,
Scout replaces all objects transitively accessible from the global scope with Proxy objects,
and logs all reads and writes to them. In contrast, BCause uses WebIDL to surgically
interpose only on the browser-provided interfaces related to event causality.
8.4 Porting Code to the Browser
Browsix and Doppio significantly extend past efforts to bring traditional APIs and
general-purpose languages to the browser; Table 8.3 provides a comparison. Doppio pro-
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Environments:
Browsix 3 3 3 3 3 3
Doppio † † †
asm.js
WebAssembly
Language runtimes:
Emscripten (C/C++) † † †
GopherJS (Go) †
Browsix + Emscripten 3 3 3 3 3 3
Browsix + GopherJS † 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 8.3: Feature comparison of JavaScript execution environments and language runtimes
for programs compiled to JavaScript. † indicates that the feature is only accessible by a
single running process. Browsix provides multi-process support for all of its features. Both
asm.js and WebAssembly are pure computational environments and as such don’t provide
any of the OS features listed.
vides single-process POSIX abstractions, while Browsix provides Unix abstractions and
builds on Doppio’s file system to support multiple processes.
There are many projects that compile specific programming languages to JavaScript,
but provide limited or no emulation of operating system services. To name a few, Em-
scripten [153] compiles LLVM bytecode to JavaScript, GopherJS compiles Go to JavaScript [101],
and GWT statically compiles Java to JavaScript [51]. Doppio and Browsix are designed
to provide these types of projects with the POSIX and Unix abstractions existing code
expects.
Xax is a browser plugin model designed to ease porting legacy code to the web [33]. It
shares a similar focus on OS independence and legacy support along with an asynchronous
system-call ABI, but runs native code in a hardware-isolated picoprocess. The Xax model
requires developers to compile and host binaries for all architectures an end user might
use, while Browsix and Doppio leverage the cross-platform nature of JavaScript and
WebAssembly to enable a compile-once, run-everywhere development workflow.
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The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) makes key browser APIs like HTTP
requests and cookie storage OS primitives, removing library and OS code not necessary for
those APIs from the trusted computing base [121]. Embassies refactors the web browser
to separate the client execution interface from the developer programming interface [57].
Embassies models the client as a pico-datacenter, running each tenant (web page) in a
separate VM. In addition to providing improved isolation and security for traditional web
pages, Embassies enables safely executing arbitrary native code on the client in addition
to a traditional WebKit HTML stack. Browsix and Doppio provide OS abstractions on
top of browser APIs, and could be run in IBOS or Embassies for improved isolation and
security.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
Although the browser is arguably the most widespread application runtime today, it
remains challenging to develop web applications. Web applications must be written in
JavaScript, an extraordinarily dynamic language that is designed for event-driven concur-
rency. JavaScript execution is tightly interwoven with the browser’s GUI interface, the
DOM, which obscures control flow among JavaScript events. Due to dynamism, concur-
rency, and the DOM, web applications exhibit complicated behavior that is difficult to
debug, optimize, and understand. Developers are also unable to directly translate exist-
ing code written in C, C++, and Java into JavaScript because the browser provides an
incompatible runtime environment that lacks common operating system features. Existing
web development tools use techniques intended for conventional runtime environments, and
provide limited assistance to developers facing these issues.
This dissertation introduces a complete set of development tools with full support for
the browser environment. McFly lets developers step forwards and backwards through a
program’s execution, enabling them to trace a bug’s symptom back to its root cause. BLeak
automatically guides developers to code that is responsible for significant memory leaks.
BCause creates a causal graph of a web application’s events and forms a solid foundation
for next generation browser development tools that can reason about asynchronous behavior.
Doppio and Browsix enable developers to re-use well tested code written in conventional
languages in the browser by bridging the gap between POSIX and Unix, respectively, and
the browser. These tools make it easier for developers to write, debug, optimize, and
understand their web applications.
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APPENDIX A
LEAKS FOUND BY BLEAK
In the next few pages, I document all 59 memory leaks found by BLeak in a separate
table per evaluation application. Each memory leak corresponds to a specific source code
location that causes unbounded growth; in some cases, multiple memory leaks grow the same
leak root or a single memory leak grows multiple leak roots. For each bug, I report the leak
root, the type of the leak root, the library responsible for the unbounded growth (Culprit),
whether or not the memory leak was previously known (New), if the leaked objects would
be considered stale under the assumptions discussed in Section 4.4.5 (Stale), a link to the
bug report (Bug), and whether or not the bug has been fixed. A   in the “Bug” column
indicates that I reported the bug to the culprit in an email, since the problematic code is
not open source. A † in the “Fixed” column indicates that a fix is currently under code
review, whereas 3 indicates that a fix has already been merged into the codebase. A † in the
“New” column indicates that the memory leak was unknown to the application developers,
whereas a 3 indicates that the memory leak was unknown to the developers of the culprit
library/application.
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# Leak Root Type Culprit New Stale Bug Fixed
1 document.body.childNodes DOM loadCSS [37] 3 [70] †
2 ‘blur’ listeners on window EL Google Maps [48] † [43]
3 ‘blur’ listeners on window EL Airbnb 3  
4 ‘resize’ listeners on window EL Google Maps † [43]
5 ‘click’ listeners on document EL Google Maps † [43]
6 ‘scroll’ listeners on window EL Google Maps † [43]
7 ‘scroll’ listeners on window EL Airbnb 3  
8 ‘keydown’ listeners on document EL Google Maps † [43]
9 ‘keypress’ listeners on document EL Google Maps † [43]
10 document. e3 [‘keydown’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
11 ‘keyup’ listeners on document EL Google Maps † [43]
12 e3 [‘resize’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
13 document. e3 [‘keyup’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
14 document. e3 [‘click’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
15 e3 [‘blur’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
16 document. e3 [‘keypress’] Obj. Google Maps † [43]
17 ‘MSFullscreenChange’ listeners on
document
EL Google Maps † [43]
18 ‘fullscreenchange’ listeners on document EL Google Maps † [43]
19 ‘mozfullscreenchange’ listeners on
document
EL Google Maps † [43]
20 ‘webkitfullscreenchange’ listeners on
document
EL Google Maps † [43]
21 document. e3
[‘fullscreenchange’]
Obj. Google Maps † [43]
22 document. e3
[‘mozfullscreenchange’]
Obj. Google Maps † [43]
23 document. e3
[‘webkitfullscreenchange’]
Obj. Google Maps † [43]
24 document. e3
[‘MSFullscreenChange’]
Obj. Google Maps † [43]
25 document.head.childNodes DOM GTM [49] 3 [135]
26 xdc Obj. Google Maps 3 3 [141] 3
27 ‘focus’ listeners on window EL Airbnb 3  
28 ga.h.t0.b.data.keys Array G. Analytics [45] 3 3 [140]
29 document.body.
childNodes[126].childNodes
DOM Criteo One-
Tag [32]
3   †
30 e.extraData in closure of
criteo q.push
Array Criteo OneTag 3 3   †
31 A in closure of inner property on the
second ‘popstate’ listener of window
Array Airbnb 3 3  
32 n[‘5v9T’].exports. events
[’header:search’] within closure
of webpackJsonp
Array Airbnb 3  
Table A.1: Memory leaks in Airbnb found by BLeak
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# Leak Root Type Culprit New Stale Bug Fixed
33 jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.resize
Array Piwik 3 [130] 3
34 jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.resize
Array Piwik 3 [130] 3
35 jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.resize
Array Piwik 3 [131] 3
36 bb in closure of Raphael Obj. Raphael.js [12] 3 3 [129] †
37 body.jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.mouseup in closure of
$widgetContent. proto .mwheelIntent
Array Piwik 3 [130] 3
38 document.body.childNodes DOM Piwik 3 [131] 3
39 allRequests in closure of
a.piwikApi.withTokenInUrl in closure of
Ea.jQuery223056319336220622062.$injector
.invoke in closure of jQuery
Piwik Array 3 3 [139] 3
40 $widgetContent[‘0’]
.jQuery223056319336220622062.$scope
.$$listeners.$destroy
Array Piwik 3 3 [134]
41 jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.click
Array Materialize [79] 3 [137] 3
42 piwik.UI.UIControl. controls Array Piwik 3 3 [132] 3
43 Property jQuery223056319336220622061
.events.click on all div children of
#columnPreview
Array Piwik 3 [133] 3
Table A.2: Memory leaks in Piwik found by BLeak
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# Leak Root Type Culprit New Stale Bug Fixed
44 angular.element.cache[3]
.events[‘resize’]
Array Ment.io [30] † [148] †
45 angular.element.cache[2]
.events[‘click’]
Array Ment.io † [148] †
46 angular.element.cache[2]
.events[‘paste’]
Array Ment.io † [148] †
47 angular.element.cache[2]
.events[‘keypress’]
Array Ment.io † [148] †
48 angular.element.cache[2]
.events[‘keydown’]
Array Ment.io † [148] †
49 Loomio.records.discussions.collection
.DynamicViews
Array Loomio 3 3 [138] 3
50 angular.element.cache[4].data.$scope
.$parent.$$listeners
.$translateChangeSuccess
Array AngularJS
(1.x) [46]
3 3 [142] 3
51 Loomio.records.stanceChoices
.collection.DynamicViews
Array Loomio 3 3 [138] 3
52 Loomio.records.versions.collection
.DynamicViews
Array Loomio 3 3 [138] 3
Table A.3: Memory leaks in Loomio found by BLeak
# Leak Root Type Culprit New Stale Bug Fixed
53 list in closure of tuples[0][3].add in clo-
sure of $.ready.then, and list in clo-
sure of tuples[2][3].add in closure of
$.ready.then
Array jQuery [123] † 3 [18] †
54 EventLog.eventbindings Array Mailpile 3 [127] 3
55 document.body.childNodes[3]
.childNodes[3].childNodes
DOM Mailpile 3 [128] 3
Table A.4: Memory leaks in Mailpile found by BLeak
# Leak Root Type Culprit New Stale Bug Fixed
56 ‘mouseover’ listeners on
cm.display.wrapper
EL Firefox debugger 3 [136] 3
57 ‘mouseup’ listeners on
cm.display.wrapper
EL Firefox debugger 3 [136] 3
58 ‘mousedown’ listeners on
cm.display.wrapper
EL Firefox debugger 3 [136] 3
59 cm. handlers.scroll Array Firefox debugger 3 [136] 3
Table A.5: Memory leaks in the Firefox debugger found by BLeak
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APPENDIX B
BLEAK EVALUATION APPLICATION LOOPS
This section lists the code for all of the loops used in the evaluation (§7.3). These scripts
are the only input BLeak needs to automatically locate, rank, and debug the memory leaks
from the evaluation. Note that the line counts reported in Figure 4.1 ignore comment lines.
1 exports.loop = [{
2 check: function() {
3 const buttons = document.getElementsByTagName('button');
4 return document.getElementsByTagName('a')[4].getAttribute('aria-selected') ===
'true';↪→
5 },
6 next: function() {
7 document.getElementsByTagName('a')[5].click();
8 }
9 }, {
10 check: function() {
11 const buttons = document.getElementsByTagName('button');
12 return document.getElementsByTagName('a')[5].getAttribute('aria-selected') ===
'true' && buttons.length > 11 && buttons[11].innerText.trim() === "Room type"↪→
13 },
14 next: function() {
15 document.getElementsByTagName('a')[4].click();
16 }
17 }];
Table B.1: Airbnb’s loop.
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1 exports.login = [
2 {
3 check: function() {
4 const input = document.getElementsByTagName('input');
5 const username = input[0];
6 const password = input[2];
7 const submit = document.getElementsByClassName('submit')[0];
8 return !!(username && password && submit);
9 },
10 next: function() {
11 const input = document.getElementsByTagName('input');
12 const username = input[0];
13 const password = input[2];
14 const submit = document.getElementsByClassName('submit')[0];
15 username.value = "bleak";
16 password.value = "bleakpldi";
17 submit.click();
18 }
19 }
20 ];
21 exports.loop = [
22 {
23 check: function() {
24 const svg = document.getElementsByTagName('svg');
25 const canvas = document.getElementsByTagName('canvas');
26 return svg.length === 1 && canvas.length === 42;
27 },
28 next: function() {
29 document.getElementsByClassName('item')[1].click();
30 }
31 }
32 ];
Table B.2: Piwik’s loop.
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1 exports.login = [{
2 check: function() {
3 const emailField = document c
.getElementsByTagName('input')[1];↪→
4 if (emailField) {
5 return emailField.getAttribute('name')
=== 'email';↪→
6 }
7 return false;
8 },
9 next: function() {
10 const emailField = document c
.getElementsByTagName('input')[1];↪→
11 emailField.value = 'default@loomio.org';
12 // Notify Angular code of change.
13 emailField.dispatchEvent(new
Event("change"));↪→
14 const submitBtn = document c
.getElementsByTagName('button')[2];↪→
15 submitBtn.click();
16 }
17 }, {
18 check: function() {
19 const pswdField = document c
.getElementsByTagName('input')[1];↪→
20 const modalHeader = document c
.getElementsByTagName('h2')[3];↪→
21 const submitBtn = document c
.getElementsByTagName('button')[3];↪→
22 return submitBtn && pswdField &&
pswdField.name === "password" &&
modalHeader &&
modalHeader.innerText === "Welcome
back, default@loomio.org!" &&
submitBtn.innerText === "SIGN IN";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
23 },
24 next: function() {
25 const pswdField = document c
.getElementsByTagName('input')[1];↪→
26 pswdField.value = 'b0eb3a48';
27 pswdField.dispatchEvent(new
Event("change"));↪→
28 const submitBtn = document c
.getElementsByTagName('button')[3];↪→
29 submitBtn.click();
30 }
31 }];
32 exports.setup = [{
33 check: function() {
34 const tp = document c
.getElementsByClassName('thread-preview');↪→
35 if (tp.length > 0) {
36 const thread = tp[0];
37 return thread.childNodes.length > 0 &&
thread.childNodes[0].tagName ===
"A" && thread.childNodes[0] c
.getAttribute('href') ===
"/d/6jZ4c8FL/how-to-use-loomio";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
38 }
39 return false;
40 },
41 next: function() {
42 document c
.getElementsByTagName('md_icon_button')[0] c
.click();
↪→
↪→
43 }
44 }];
45 exports.loop = [{
46 check: function() {
47 const span = document c
.getElementsByTagName('span')[6];↪→
48 return !!span && span.innerText === "Fun
Group 1";↪→
49 },
50 next: function() {
51 document c
.getElementsByTagName('span')[6] c
.click();
↪→
↪→
52 }
53 }, {
54 check: function() {
55 const tp = document c
.getElementsByClassName('thread-preview');↪→
56 if (tp.length > 0) {
57 const thread = tp[0];
58 return thread.childNodes.length > 0 &&
thread.childNodes[0].tagName ===
"A" && thread.childNodes[0] c
.getAttribute('href') ===
"/d/6jZ4c8FL/how-to-use-loomio";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
59 }
60 return false;
61 },
62 next: function() {
63 document c
.getElementsByClassName('thread-preview')[0] c
.childNodes[0].click();
↪→
↪→
64 }
65 }, {
66 check: function() {
67 const paragraphs =
document.getElementsByTagName('p');↪→
68 const h3 = document c
.getElementsByTagName('h3')[3];↪→
69 return paragraphs.length > 6 && h3 &&
h3.innerText.indexOf("Loomio Helper
Bot started a proposal") === 0 &&
paragraphs[5].innerText ===
"Welcome to Loomio, an online place
to make decisions together.";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
70 },
71 next: function() {
72 // Opens menu w/ logout.
73 document c
.getElementsByTagName('md_icon_button')[0] c
.click();
↪→
↪→
74 }
75 }];
Table B.3: Loomio’s loop.
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1 const emailSubjects = [ "YO DAWG", "Icelandic Banana", "Demo ipsum",
2 "CRYPTO-GRAM, January 15, 2014"];
3 function returnToInbox() {
4 document.getElementById('sidebar-tag-b').children[0].click();
5 }
6 function itemSteps(i) {
7 let lastCheck = 0;
8 function inboxCheck() {
9 return document.getElementsByClassName('message-subject').length === 0 &&
document.getElementsByClassName('item-subject').length > 0;↪→
10 }
11 function inboxClick() {
12 document.getElementsByClassName('item-subject')[i].click()
13 }
14 return [{
15 check: inboxCheck,
16 next: inboxClick
17 }, {
18 check: function() {
19 const ms = document.getElementsByClassName('message-subject');
20 const rv = ms.length === 1 && ms[0].innerText === emailSubjects[i];
21 const now = Date.now();
22 // Mailpile's server fails a *lot*, requiring multiple clicks to get through.
23 // This is a hack to get around what I consider to be a bug.
24 if (!rv && inboxCheck() && (now - lastCheck) > 1000) {
25 inboxClick();
26 }
27 lastCheck = now;
28 return rv;
29 },
30 next: function() {
31 lastCheck = 0;
32 returnToInbox();
33 }
34 }];
35 }
36 exports.loop = [];
37 for (let i = 0; i < emailSubjects.length; i++) {
38 exports.loop.push.apply(exports.loop, itemSteps(i));
39 }
Table B.4: Mailpile’s loop.
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1 exports.loop = [{
2 check: function() {
3 const nodes = document.getElementsByClassName('node');
4 const sourceTabs = document.getElementsByClassName('source-tab');
5 return sourceTabs.length === 0 && nodes.length > 1 && nodes[1].innerText ===
"main.js";↪→
6 },
7 next: function() {
8 document.getElementsByClassName('node')[1].click();
9 }
10 }, {
11 check: function() {
12 // code mirror must be open, tab must be added, etc.
13 return document.getElementsByClassName('CodeMirror-line').length > 2 &&
document.getElementsByClassName('source-tab').length === 1 &&
document.getElementsByClassName('close-btn').length === 1;
↪→
↪→
14 },
15 next: function() {
16 document.getElementsByClassName('close-btn')[0].click();
17 }
18 }];
Table B.5: Firefox Debugger’s loop.
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